Managing Risk on a $25 Million Bet: Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation by Bartlett, Robert  P., III
MANAGING RISK ON A $25 MILLION BET: VENTURE CAPITAL,  
AGENCY COSTS AND THE FALSE DICHOTOMY OF THE CORPORATION 
 




An implicit dichotomy of the corporation exists in legal scholarship.  On one 
side of the dichotomy rests the publicly-held corporation suffering from a 
significant conflict of interest between its managers and dispersed shareholders; on 
the other side, the closely-held corporation plagued by inter-shareholder conflict.   
This Article argues that understanding the agency problems that can exist 
within a firm demands a rejection of this traditional dichotomy and the theories of 
the firm built upon it.  Using venture capital finance, this Article demonstrates for 
the first time how this dichotomy obscures how all firmspublic and private
often face the same agency problems.  Companies receiving venture capital (VC) 
investment are uniquely situated to examine this dichotomy, as they represent 
closely-held firms structured to transition quickly to public equity markets.  
Additionally, by separating investment from company management, VC investment 
creates many of the investor-manager conflicts inherent in public companies.  
By analyzing VC investment contracts, this Article reveals that start-up 
companies are indeed plagued by both vertical agency problems between 
investors and managers and horizontal agency problems among VC investors 
themselves.  Significantly, academic scholarship has ignored the potential for inter-
investor conflicts, using instead an analytical framework associated with public 
corporations that focuses exclusively on investor-manager agency problems.  In so 
doing, VC scholarship provides a clear example of how the dichotomy of the 
corporation forces scholars to wear blinders in analyzing the agency problems in 
firms.  To understand the full scope of these problemsand their implication for 
corporate investorsa new model of the firm is required that applies to all firms, 
public and private.  This Article outlines this model and articulates its implications 
for corporate investors, corporate scholars and corporate law in general. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
In 1999, two venture capital firms invested $25 million in a newly-
formed Internet search firm called Google.  Four years later, after its initial 
public offering, their investment was worth over $4 billion.1  Yet not every 
company is a Google.  Consider, for example, another $25 million 
investment made by prominent venture capital firm Benchmark Capital.  Its 
investment in Juniper Financial Corp., originally made during the dot-com 
bubble in 2000, ultimately resulted in a well-publicized and futile lawsuit 
by Benchmark against Juniper and a co-investor in the company when 
Juniper consummated a transaction that effectively destroyed the value of 
Benchmarks investment.2  The challenge for investors is how best to 
manage risk in a world of uncertainty, where the $25 million bet could turn 
out to be a Google or a Juniper Financial. 
                                                
1 See Bob Sechler, Web-Search Sector Lures Venture Fires, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at B3B. 
2 See Lisa Bransten, Benchmark Capital Sues Company It Nurtured, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2002, at C5. 
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Not surprisingly, analysis of the structural risks of corporate investment 
is a foundational issue for legal and financial scholarsbut one in which 
context matters.  Ask a corporate scholar to describe the structural 
investment risks for a publicly-held corporation, and you will undoubtedly 
hear about the significant conflicts of interest that exist between a 
corporations managers and its dispersed shareholders.3  Ask the same about 
a closely-held corporation, and be prepared for an analysis about the 
potential for inter-shareholder conflicts.4  There are, in short, two 
corporations in modern corporate scholarship: one public, one private.5  A 
peculiar result given thatfor all practical purposesour corporation 
statutes envision but one corporation.6 
The thesis of this Article is that an accurate understanding of corporate 
investment risk demands the rejection of this traditional dichotomy of the 
corporation and the theories of the firm built upon it.  Using venture capital 
finance, this Article demonstrates for the first time how this dichotomy 
obscures how all firmspublic and privatefrequently face the same 
structural investment risks.  Indeed, only by constructing a model of the 
firm that ignores this false dichotomy can we recognize the full scope of 
investment risks that affect firms of any mold. 
Start-up companies7 receiving venture capital (VC) investment are 
uniquely situated to examine this dichotomy, as they exist at a cross-roads 
                                                
3 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1659 (2002) (A well-known agency problem exists between managers and 
dispersed shareholders of public corporations.); see also infra TAN 23-33 & 245-247. 
4 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations 
of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1745 (2001) ([I]t is widely recognized that participants in 
closely held corporations face a high risk of loss from their fellow participants opportunism); see 
also infra TAN 256-258. 
5 See John C. Coates, IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. 
Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 840 (1999).  The literature comparing private and public 
corporations has made clear that the fundamental difference between the two relates to these differing 
dimensions of structural investment risk.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close 
Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 277-83 (1986) (describing as the fundamental 
difference the investor-manager conflicts created by the separation of risk bearing and management in 
publicly-held firms and the inter-shareholder conflicts created by its unification in closely-held firms); 
Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 1735 (2001) (noting that closely held corporations generally do not 
suffer the separation of ownership and control thought to plague publicly held firms  [but]  are 
famous for presenting their own problems  in the form of opportunistic behavior between 
shareholders.); Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 489, 495-96 (2002) (describing the agency problem associated with the inherent 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders of public corporations which represents a 
different problem[] than those posed by close corporations). 
6 See Coates, supra note 5, at 840 ([D]efault corporate law has only erratically and incompletely 
distinguished between [close corporations and public corporations].)  Although many states provide 
special close corporation statutes, they are systematically underutilized by close corporations. See 
generally Tara Wortman, Unlocking Lock-In: Limited Liability Companies and the Key to 
Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1362, 1381-86 (1995). 
7 This Article uses the term start-up company to refer to any business organization receiving VC 
financing.  Although any business entity may receive VC financing, for a variety of technical reasons, 
most VC investors prefer to invest in corporations. See JACK LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, 
PRIVATE EQUITY AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 9 (1999). 
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between private and public firms.  VC investments are made in private 
companies developing new businesses with the goal of moving these 
companies to public equity markets either through an initial public offering 
(IPO) or an acquisition by a publicly-traded corporation.  Additionally, by 
separating risk-bearing investment from day-to-day company management, 
VC investment creates many of the agency problems faced by investors in 
public corporations.  In this regard, they represent a logical starting point for 
examining how a firm can experience both the inter-shareholder conflicts 
typically associated with private companies as well as the investor-manger 
conflicts typically associated with public companies. 
At the same time, the academic literature on VC investment provides a 
clear example of how the implicit dichotomy of corporate scholarship 
obscures an accurate understanding of investment risk.  The significant 
investor-manager conflicts created by VC investment have led corporate 
scholars to apply an analytical framework to VC finance that is generally 
associated with analyses of public corporations.  For over twenty-five years, 
scholarly analyses of VC investment have been based on a simple, standard 
model of VC investment that has focused exclusively on the conflicts of 
interest that exist between VC investors and company managers.  Informed 
in large part by the agency costs theory of the firm introduced in 1976 by 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling,8 the model focuses on the 
significant information asymmetries and agency risks that exist between a 
firms investors and its managers and the mechanisms VC investors use to 
minimize the resulting agency costs.9   
Notably absent from discussions of VC investment are considerations of 
how start-up companies also suffer the types of shareholder-shareholder 
conflicts that have historically plagued closely-held firms.  Of particular 
                                                
8 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
9 This model of VC investment can be found in virtually any academic discussion of VC finance. See, 
e.g.,William Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. 
ECON. 473, 473 (1990) (The venture-capital industry has evolved operating procedures and contracting 
practices that are well adapted to environments characterized by uncertainty and information 
asymmetries between principals and agents.); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: 
Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2003) ([T]he keystone of the 
U.S. venture capital market is private orderingthe contracting structure that developed to manage the 
extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs that inevitably bedevil early-stage, high-
technology financing.); D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting In The Information Age, 2 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 138 (1998)(Most subsequent scholarship has followed Sahlmans 
lead, viewing venture capital contracts exclusively as mechanisms for reducing potential agency costs to 
venture capitalists.); Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg, Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: 
Evidence from Venture Capital Analyses, 59 J. FIN. 2177, 2178 (2004) (The theories [on VC finance] 
predict that characteristics of VC contracts will be related to the extent of agency problems [with 
entrepreneurs].); PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 158 (2004) 
(describing the problems faced by investors given the degree of asymmetric information between VC 
investors and entrepreneurs concerning a start-up company).  For a concise summary of the literature, 
see generally Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture 
Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP: LINKING GOVERNANCE 
WITH REGULATORY POLICY at 55-69 (Michael Whincop ed., 2001). 
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significance for start-up companies are conflicts among VC investors 
themselves.  Studies of VC investment utilizing the traditional agency 
cost model commonly assume either a single VC investor or a 
homogenized group of VC firms to simplify their analysis of management 
agency risk.10  Yet, as this Article demonstrates, VC investments are made 
jointly by investors whose economic interests often clash.  Paradoxically, it 
is the very techniques investors use to minimize potential agency risk with 
company managers that create the potential for these inter-investor 
conflicts.   
To minimize manager agency risk, VC investors undertake a number of 
strategies in making company investments, including the acquisition of 
control and monitoring rights, the staging of investments through rounds 
of financing and the syndication of investments with other VC investors.11  
Although much has been written about these strategies, little has been said 
about an important practical consequence of themthese strategies cause 
investors to acquire a companys securities at different times and different 
prices.  This simple fact of VC investment, when combined with the 
compensation structure of most VC funds, can lead to significantly 
divergent preferences among a companys investors concerning the 
company and its transactions.  The divergence of preferences is particularly 
acute with regard to the timing of an exit event (such as an IPO or an 
acquisition) and the companys future financing.  Aware of these potential 
conflicts, a VC investor negotiates specific economic and control rights with 
a start-up company and its other investors to protect these preferences when 
making an investment.  These contractual provisions, however, only 
accentuate the potential for inter-investor conflict by driving a wedge 
between the economic interests of the companys investors.  Consequently, 
a companys VC investors will often have both the incentive and the means 
to engage in rent-seeking behavior vis-à-vis other investors in certain 
economic contexts.   
Thus, to truly understand VC investment, it is essential to move beyond 
the traditional analytical frameworks used in corporate scholarship.  
Specifically, understanding VC investment requires a model of the firm that 
accounts for at least two forms of potential agency risk:  the vertical 
agency risk posed by the delegation of corporate authority to unrelated 
managers and the horizontal agency risk posed by the significant control 
rights held by other investors.  To be sure, this insight echoes those such as 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout who have likewise noted the inadequacies of 
the traditional principal-agent paradigm of the public corporation.  Blair and 
                                                
10 For instance, even where VC firms are recognized as collectively investing in a start-up company, 
their interests appear unified and aligned.  See, e.g., Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg, Financial 
Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV 
ECON. STUD. 281, 283 (2003) (It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider agency problems among 
VC syndicates.  Given the repeated nature of syndications, we believe it is reasonable to aggregate 
holdings and assume that the VCs in each round act to maximize value.). 
11 See infra Part II(A). 
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Stouts team production model rightfully expands the analytical 
framework by considering the full range of inter-stakeholder conflicts that 
exist within a firm (e.g., shareholder vs. managers, shareholder vs. 
bondholder, etc.).12  Their model, however, is expressly limited to public 
firms and stops short of considering the possibility for intra-stakeholder 
conflicts such as those that so critically shape VC investment.  Moreover, 
their team production model continues to view agency problems as 
essentially stable and concrete.13  Yet as VC investment demonstrates, these 
problems are commonly dynamic and evolving; it is the very attempt by 
investors to manage investor-manager agency risk that creates a second 
dimension of agency risk among investors themselves.  By analyzing the 
agency problems in VC finance, this Article therefore lays the groundwork 
for a new model of the firm that incorporates the dynamic formation of both 
inter-stakeholder and intra-stakeholder conflicts and applies to all firms, 
public and private.  Figure 1 sets forth this dynamic agency cost model as 
it applies to VC investment. 
 
A dynamic agency cost model provides more than just a better 
descriptive account of the potential agency problems in a firm.  As a matter 
of corporate finance, it provides a significantly more robust means with 
which to analyze the non-systematic risks of corporate investment.  
                                                
12 For a general description of Blair and Stouts team production theory, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn 
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
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Figure 1:  Traditional and Dynamic Agency Cost Models of VC Investment 
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Financial contracting theory tells us that when faced with non-systematic 
risk such as agency risk, rational investors should respond by contracting 
against it or discounting the value of the investment.14  Thus, in the context 
of VC investment, much of the academic scholarship has sought to develop 
formal models describing how VC investors can best address investor-
manager agency risk in VC investment.15  Yet given the reality of both 
investor-manager and inter-investor agency risk, the traditional agency cost 
models focus on vertical agency risk with managers necessarily provides 
us with an incomplete understanding of how VC investors should price and 
structure VC investments.  The dynamic agency cost model remedies this 
limitation by providing a framework that accounts for the full scope of 
agency risk in VC investment.  As such, it provides the proper starting point 
for practitioners and scholars alike for analyzing how to plan successful VC 
investments and, more generally, how we can develop efficient VC 
economies.  That business and contract scholars tend to draw lessons from 
VC contracting further strengthens the need for an accurate understanding 
of this important area of corporate finance.16  
For similar reasons, the model permits a much more nuanced 
understanding of how investors actually use financial contracts to address 
company-specific investment risk.  Just as the traditional analytical 
frameworks have worked to obscure the scope of agency risks within a firm, 
they have likewise worked to limit academic analysis of how investors use 
financial contracts to control these risks.  Once again, VC scholarship 
provides a ready example.  An impressive body of scholarship now exists 
that seeks to present a positive account of how VC investors draft VC 
                                                
14 See AMIR BARNEA, AGENCY PROBLEMS AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 2 (1985). 
15 See, e.g., Francesca Cornelli & Oved Yosha, Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities, 
24 REV. ECON. STUD. 126 (2003) (financial model demonstrating optimal use of convertible securities to 
minimize management window dressing of corporate performance); Klaus Schmidt, Convertible 
Securities and Venture Capital Finance, 58 J. FIN. 1139 (2003) (financial model demonstrating optimal 
use of convertible securities to induce efficient investment by entrepreneurs and VC investors); Thomas 
Hellman, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 29 RAND J. ECON. 57 (1998) 
(financial model demonstrating optimal use of VC control rights to protect against entrepreneur hold-
ups);  Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning, 22 J. 
BANK. FIN. 703 (1998) (financial model demonstrating optimal mixture of debt and equity to address 
moral hazard risks posed by entrepreneurs); Anat Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Robust Financial 
Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists, 49 J. FIN. 371 (1994) (financial model demonstrating 
optimal use of fixed fraction contracts to resolve agency problems between VC investors and 
entrepreneurs); Erik Berglöf, A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247 
(1994) (financial model demonstrating optimal contract design to mitigate investor-manager conflicts of 
interest). 
16 For instance, the success of VC firms in constructing a system of private ordering with few disputes 
has led commentators to suggest reform in other legal areas ranging from bankruptcy, see Douglas Baird 
& Robert Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 777-788 (2002), to close 
corporations, see Shannon Wells Stevenson, The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close 
Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties, 51 DUKE L.J. 1139 (2001).  Studies of how to develop 
venture capital markets overseas have likewise focused on the need to replicate American-style VC 
contracts to develop efficient VC economies. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 9; Haksoo Ko, Venture 
Capital in Korea? Special Law to Promote Venture Capital Companies, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 457, 
459-462 (2000). 
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contracts to protect themselves against investor-manager agency risk.17  
Viewing VC contracts through the lens of the dynamic agency cost model, 
however, we can see that real-life VC contracts are about much more than 
controlling investor-manager conflictsthey are also about controlling 
potential inter-investor conflicts.  This perspective allows us to analyze for 
the first time characteristics of VC contracting that have previously been 
ignored in VC scholarship.  By focusing on investor-manager conflicts, the 
traditional agency costs model lacks the capacity to explainindeed, even 
recognizethese prominent features of VC contracting that arise due to the 
potential for agency problems among investors.  Likewise, the dynamic 
model permits a fresh look at the reasons for and the effect of many 
common provisions of VC contracts that are distinct from traditional agency 
cost explanations. 
In this regard, the model provides a new perspective on one of the most 
persistent questions in the academic literature on VC finance:  why do VC 
investors routinely invest in preferred stock despite its numerous 
disadvantages?18  To date, the large literature on this subject has generally 
focused on preferred stocks advantageous tax characteristics and its 
capacity for aligning the interests of managers and VC investors.19  Using 
the dynamic agency cost model, this Article presents another important but 
overlooked advantage:  preferred stock makes it easier for VC investors to 
manage contractually inter-investor conflicts.  In this light, a long-held 
corporate doctrine requiring a narrow construction of preferred stock rights 
presents a troubling problem for efficient VC investment.  This doctrine 
significantly impairs VC investors ability to use preferred stock to 
minimize inter-investor agency problems, leaving VC investors little choice 
but to increase the cost of capital for start-up companies seeking VC 
investment.  As such, courts adherence to this principle risks interfering 
with an efficient contracting practice that benefits both VC investors and 
start-up companies alike.  
Finally, as this last point suggests, the dynamic agency cost model has 
important normative implications for corporate law in general.  The 
existence within a single firm of both inter-stakeholder and intra-
stakeholder conflicts places renewed emphasis on the need for governance 
                                                
17 See infra TAN 38-41. 
18 See Ronald J. Gilson and David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax 
Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 875-76 (2003). 
19 See e.g., id. at 875 (providing tax explanation for preferred stock usage); Thomas Hellman, IPOs, 
Acquisitions and the Use of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital (Graduate Sch. Of Bus., Stanford 
Univ., Research Paper No. 1702, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=257608 (explaining how convertible securities provide an optimal trade-off between the 
need to allocate cash flows to VC investors and the desire to make efficient exit decisions); Berglöf, 
supra note 15, at 247 (providing control theory for preferred stock usage); William Bratton, Venture 
Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891 (2002) 
(same); Cornelli & Yosha, supra note 15 (finding convertible securities prevent signal manipulation by 
entrepreneurs); Sahlman, supra note 9 (noting that [f]lexible conversion terms alter the risk-and-return-
sharing scheme and encourage entrepreneurs to build value); see also infra TAN 56-59. 
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structures to resolve these conflicts as they arise.  While a full analysis of 
these structures must await a separate exposition, the VC investment 
experience provides at least two initial insights.  First, where corporate 
participants have themselves sought to mediate these conflicts through 
express contract provisions, courts do little good by treating these 
provisions as anything other than contract.  To the extent courts rely on 
doctrines such as the narrow construction of preferred stock rights, they 
give a meaning to these contract provisions that is distinct from their 
original intent and potentially increase the risk of agency problems within a 
firm.  Second, the dynamic development of agency problems in VC 
investment provides a cautionary tale for those who seek to remedy agency 
problems of any sort.  As this Article shows, the very attempt to manage 
one form of agency problems may itself result in a secondequally 
troublesomedimension of agency problems among other corporate 
constituents. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides a brief overview of 
the traditional agency costs model of VC investment, highlighting how it 
provides an incomplete explanation for many prominent features of VC 
finance.  Part III sets forth a dynamic agency cost model of VC investment.  
Specifically, it shows how the investment techniques described in Part II 
create potential inter-investor conflicts of interest to which VC investors 
respond by negotiating contract provisions that further increase the potential 
for investor conflict.  Part IV examines how the economy following the 
dot-com bubble turned these potential conflicts into actual ones and laid 
the foundation for a series of inter-investor lawsuits after 2000.  These 
include the landmark case of Benchmark Capital Partners v. Vague20one 
of the most famous lawsuits concerning the VC industry, but until now, one 
that remained unexplained by the traditional agency cost model.  After 
examining the inter-investor dispute underlying Benchmark, Part V moves 
to an explanation of how VC investors ordinarily rely on preferred stock 
contracting to resolve these disputes and why this system failed in 
Benchmark.  The Part continues by examining how the development of 
inter-investor conflict in Benchmark signifies the need to reassess the theory 
of the firm in corporate legal scholarship.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  THE TRADITIONAL AGENCY COST MODEL OF VC INVESTMENT  
A.  How to Make the Entrepreneur a Better Agent 
Since William Sahlman published his highly influential article on VC 
finance in 1990,21 venture capital scholarship has been concerned with 
primarily one question:  how do VC investors respond to the extreme 
uncertainty, information asymmetry and agency problems inherent in VC 
                                                
20 2002 WL 31057462 (Del. Ch., July 15, 2002), affd, 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003). 
21 See Sahlman, supra note 9. 
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investment?22  From the perspective of intellectual history, the singular 
obsession with this question is hardly surprising.  Fundamentally, the 
question is rooted in the same challenge that has occupied corporate law 
scholars and economists for over half a centuryhow do investors in 
modern corporations avoid the multiple problems that arise when ownership 
of the corporation (i.e., equity investment) is separated from its control (i.e., 
management)?  Appreciation of this challenge, famously articulated by 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 193223 and subsequently formalized by 
Jensen and Meckling in 1976, defines the primary analytical framework 
used in contemporary corporate scholarship.24   
Alternatively dubbed the agency cost theory of the firm and the 
nexus-of-contracts conception of the corporation,25 this analytical 
framework models organizations as webs of express, implied, and 
metaphorical contracts among individuals with conflicting interests.26  At 
the center of this web rests the corporationa legal fiction that serves as a 
nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.27  A critical 
insight of this approach has been to demonstrate the importance of 
principal-agent economics for the study of firms.28  Agency relationships 
are created among contracting parties because one party (the agent) will 
ordinarily hold discretionary and unobservable decision-making power to 
affect the wealth of another (the principal).  Recognizing that an agent may 
not always act in its best interests, a principal may discount the value of the 
relationship or it might expend resources to monitor the agent.  Conversely, 
to avoid these costs an agent might choose to offer bonds to a principal as 
a guarantee of good faith.  Monitoring and bonding are not costless, 
                                                
22 See Gilson, supra note 9, at 1069.  
23 See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
127-52 (1932). 
24 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 248 (The literature employing the principal-agent approach 
[to corporate governance] is too voluminous to cite in its entirety.); Robert Sitkoff, An Agency Cost 
Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORN. L. REV. 621, 621 (2004) (Agency cost theories of the firm dominate the 
modern literature of corporate law and economics.). 
25 In general, legal scholars have demonstrated a propensity for the term nexus-of-contracts while 
economists have preferred agency cost theory, although the terms are used inter-changeably within 
both academic camps.  Jensen and Meckling utilized each concept in setting forth the general theory, see 
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 308-10, and all credit them with first developing the framework.  
See Sharon Hannes, Images of Organizations and Interfirm Externalities: A Comment on Prof. Rubin, 6 
THEOR. INQ. IN LAW 391, 393 n 3 (2005).  This Article uses the term agency cost theory because (a) it 
better emphasizes the principal-agent conflict between investors and managers that is central to corporate 
scholarship in general and VC scholarship in particular and (b) it reflects Jensen and Mecklings primary 
concern with analyzing the scope of agency costs within a firm.  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, 
at 308-10. 
26 See id. at 310-11.  For a definitive exposition of this theory in corporate legal scholarship, see FRANK 
H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 
(1991). 
27 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 310. 
28 As Jensen and Meckling describe it, [m]any problems associated with the inadequacy of the current 
theory of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of agency relationships.  Id. at 308; 
see also Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 291 
(1980). 
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however; nor are they perfect.  It is impossible to prevent all divergences 
between an agents decisions and those decisions that maximize the 
principals welfare.  Some residual welfare loss is inevitable in every 
agency relationship that will likewise require the principal to discount the 
value of the relationship.  This residual loss, together with monitoring 
expenditures by a principal and bonding expenditures by the agent, 
constitute the total agency costs in an agency relationship.29    
As applied to organizations, agency theory proved especially useful in 
analyzing the conflict that exists between shareholders and managers.  
Although agency relationships can exist among a variety of organizational 
participantsshareholders vs. bondholders, labor vs. management, etc.
corporate scholarship has focused primarily on the agency relationship 
between shareholders and managers in modern public corporations.30  For 
instance, shareholder-manager agency conflicts dominate Frank Easterbrook 
and Daniel Fischels classic analysis, The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law.  In their view, corporate law should generally defer to the contractual 
arrangements explicitly or implicitly agreed to among corporate 
participants, and the agency costs created by the separation of management 
and risk bearing fundamentally shape these arrangements.31  Other 
scholars, holding a less sanguine view of market efficiency, have used the 
theory to argue for reform efforts that reduce agency costs born by public 
company shareholders.32  Yet even where corporate scholars disagree over 
the implications of this agency relationship, they share a common 
predisposition to view it as the central agency relationship within a 
corporation.  Indeed, today the agency cost model is commonly described as 
relating solely to the agency problems created by the separation between 
management and risk-bearing equity in public corporations.33 
Although VC investment occurs in private rather than public companies, 
the influence of agency cost theory is clearly evident in virtually any 
discussion of VC investment.  In general, VC scholarship has focused on 
the variety of agency problems a VC investor encounters due to the 
separation between investment and company management.  For instance, as 
a condition of an investors investment, managers are required to transfer a 
                                                
29 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 308. 
30 Jensen and Meckling themselves discuss only two agency relationships in setting forth their agency 
cost theory:  the contract characterizing the relationship between the manager (i.e., agent) of the firm 
and the outside equity and debt holders (i.e., principals).  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 310.  
31 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 8-22. 
32 See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARD. L. REV. 1459, 1473-77 (2005) (summarizing 
literature). 
33 See, e.g., John Core, et. al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance? 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1145 (2005) (This model rests on the widely accepted agency cost model of the 
American corporation: diffuse ownership of large corporations leaves substantial discretion in 
professional managers hands as to how to run the company, and managers can use this discretion in 
ways that do not maximize shareholder value.); see also Blair and Stout, supra note 12, at 248 
(Contemporary discussions of corporate governance have come to be dominated by the view that public 
corporations are little more than bundles of assets collectively owned by shareholders (principals) who 
hire directors and officers (agents) to manage those assets on their behalf.). 
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portion of the profits generated from the venture back to the investor.34  The 
managers will therefore have a tendency to shirk or otherwise fail to exert 
an optimal level of effort.35  The managers may also have incentives to use 
firm resources to create private benefits, to adopt strategies that entail 
inappropriate levels of risk relative to the expected return and/or to threaten 
to leave the firm at a time when replacement of a manager is costly.36  
Additionally, managers know more about the company and their abilities 
than investors do.  This asymmetry of information makes it difficult for VC 
investors to distinguish between competent and incompetent managers.37  
Likewise, a primary goal of VC scholarship has been to understand the 
manner in which VC investors address these agency problems and thereby 
minimize the agency costs of VC finance.  The literature is extensive, 
ranging from descriptive accounts of VC contracts,38 to theoretical models 
of optimal contract design,39 to testing these models against empirical 
analyses of VC contracts.40  Although commentators often differ as to the 
optimal means to minimize agency costs, there is general consensus that 
venture capitalists have developed financial contracts that are successful in 
doing so.41  Under this agency cost model of VC investment, venture 
capitalists accomplish this by designing contracts that provide for:  (1) 
staged investment, (2) the use of equity-based compensation, (3) control and 
monitoring rights, (4) the sale of convertible preferred stock and (5) the 
ability to syndicate investments. 
1.  Staged Investment.  A venture capitalist will typically stage its 
investment in a start-up company by incrementally investing capital over 
time after observing the companys progress in relation to its initial 
projections.42  Staging its investment allows a VC investor to minimize the 
risk of investing in an unfamiliar management team and a business with 
uncertain prospects.  If the business or team disappoints, the VC investor 
may discontinue funding the company, thereby cutting its losses.   
Staged investing also provides an important screening and monitoring 
function.  Managers, realizing the consequences of failing to meet their 
projections, will be less likely to exaggerate a companys prospects in 
negotiating with a VC investor.  Low-quality managers may be deterred all 
                                                
34 See Steven Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, at 3 (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 218175, 2000), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=218175. 
35 See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 56. 
36 See id. 
37 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 158.  
38 See, e.g., Sahlman, supra note 9; GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 157-273; Bernard Black & 
Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. 
FIN. ECON. 243, 253 (1998).   
39 See supra note 15. 
40 See, e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg, supra note 10, at 281 (comparing actual VC contracts to the 
assumed and predicted ones in different financial contracting theories.); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra 
note 9, at 2177-81 (same); GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 171-200, 242-271.  
41 See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 59. 
42 See id. at 60; Black & Gilson, supra note 38, at 253.  
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together from seeking VC financing.43  Once an investment is made, staged 
investment thereafter provides a powerful incentive for managers to meet 
the designated milestones in order to receive future financing.44  Managers 
might seek financing from an outside investor, but most commentators 
believe an existing investors unwillingness to fund the company provides a 
negative signal to new investors regarding the companys quality.45   
Moreover, the existing VC investor will likely have negotiated veto rights 
and rights of first offer on the future issuance of securities that allow the 
investor to block new equity financings by the company.46   
2.  Equity-Based Compensation.  The structure of management 
compensation provides a secondary means to control the agency risks 
inherent in VC investing.  Management salaries at start-up companies will 
often be set at relatively low amounts, with a significant component of 
compensation consisting of stock options or shares of restricted founders 
stock that vest over time.47  By tying managements compensation to the 
companys overall performance, equity-based compensation is intended to 
minimize the risk that managers will shirk from their duties or pursue 
private benefits that do not accrue to the companys stockholders generally.  
Likewise, the vesting provisions provide an incentive for management to 
retain their employment, thereby minimizing the risk of management 
departure.48 
3.  Control and Monitoring Rights.  A VC investor also seeks to mitigate 
agency risk with company managers through negotiating control and 
monitoring rights that are disproportionate to its stock ownership.  For 
instance, Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg found in their analysis of 213 
VC investments in 119 start-up companies that a VC investor obtained the 
right to a seat on the companys board of directors in over 40% of the 
financing transactions and controlled the board in 25%.49  Additionally, a 
VC investor typically obtains special stockholder voting rights (or 
protective provisions) allowing the investor to veto important corporate 
actions.50  The scope of these protective provisions differs from company to 
company, but a VC investor will commonly have veto rights over important 
corporate transactions such as the issuance of securities, asset sales, mergers 
or other changes in control.51  Lastly, the practical effect of staged financing 
                                                
43 See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 60.  
44 See id. 
45 See id; but see infra TAN 98-103 (noting existing investors may stop funding a company without 
necessarily harming its fundraising ability).  
46 See id. 
47 See id. at 62. 
48 See id.   
49 See Kaplan and Strömberg, supra note 10, at 287-89. 
50 See Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: A Contractarian Rebuttal to the Political 
Theory of American Corporate Finance?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 87-89 (1997). 
51 See, e.g., NVCA, Model Certificate of Incorporation at 10 n18, available at 
http://www.nvca.org/model_documents/model_docs.html [hereinafter, NVCA Model Charter] 
(providing investor veto rights over the following actions: liquidation, dissolution, change-in-control, 
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supplements these formal control rights:  by controlling a companys 
funding spigot, a VC investor gains considerable influence over the 
development of a companys business.52 
4.  Use of Convertible Preferred Stock.  In making an investment, a VC 
investor generally acquires shares of a companys convertible preferred 
stock.53  Preferred stock entitles a VC investor to numerous preferential 
economic rights such as a liquidation preference payable in the event of the 
companys liquidation or sale,54 preferential dividend rights, redemption 
rights, and antidilution protection.55   Ordinarily, shares of preferred stock 
are convertible at the option of the holder into shares of common stock, at 
which time all preferential rights are lost. 
Financial economists have extensively modeled the manner in which 
these preferred stock rights help address the agency costs and information 
asymmetries typical of VC investing.56  Prior to a manager approaching a 
venture capitalist, the preferential economic rights provide a screening 
function by discouraging low-quality entrepreneurs from seeking VC 
financing.57  Similarly, after an investment has been made, these preferential 
rights create an incentive for management to meet the companys financial 
projections.  They do so by forcing managers to face a greater risk of 
realizing little value on their common stock interests unless the company 
performs well.58  The use of preferred stock also enhances the incentive 
effect of common stock options.  The preferred stock rights allow a 
company to issue common stock to an employee at a fraction of the price of 
the preferred stock without any adverse tax consequences to the employee.59  
5.  Syndication of Investments.  Lastly, VC investors reduce agency risk 
by partnering with one or more other VC investors when investing in a start-
up company.60  Moreover, as a start-up company requires additional 
financing, the company and its VC investors will often solicit a new 
investor to lead each round of financing.  Existing investors will then co-
invest alongside it.61  For instance, in one study an average of 2.2 VC firms 
                                                                                                             
charter/bylaw modifications, creation/issuance of securities, purchase/redemption of securities, or 
change in number of directors).  The number of protective provisions requested by a VC investor may 
often be tied to an investors geographic focus.  A well-known generalization among practitioners is that 
East Coast VC investors tend to request significantly more control rights than West Coast investors.  As 
the general counsel to Charles River Ventures jests, From the West Coast perspective, [East Coast VC 
firms] look like control freaks, who are simply going to be unhelpfully interfering with and impeding 
what should just be routine corporate matters. Sarah Reed, Will West Ever Meet East?: Bicoastal 
Conflict in the Jargon of Venture-Capital Financing, 11 BUS. LAW TODAY (June 2002). 
52 See Gilson, supra note 9, at 1069. 
53 See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 286 (reporting that convertible preferred stock was used in 
95% of their sample financing transactions). 
54 For a discussion of liquidation preferences, see infra TAN 91-93. 
55 For a discussion of antidilution protection, see infra TAN 138. 
56 For a summary of this literature, see supra TAN 19. 
57 See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 64. 
58 See id. at 65-66. 
59 See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 18, at 889-909. 
60 See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 66-67. 
61 See Josh Lerner, The Syndication of Venture Capital, 23 FIN. MGMT. 16, 18 (1994). 
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invested together at a companys first stage of financing; at the second 
stage, an average of 3.3 invested together; and in later stages the average 
increased to 4.2.62   
While syndication provides VC firms a means to diversify their 
investment portfolios, it also plays an important role in addressing the 
agency costs and information asymmetries inherent in VC investment.  
Empirical studies of syndication patterns indicate that older and larger VC 
firms tend to syndicate with one another,63 suggesting that VC investors 
syndicate to obtain each others judgment with respect to particular 
investment opportunities.64  Likewise, the use of a new investor to lead 
subsequent financing rounds facilitates each financing by having an outside 
third-party set the investment terms.  At the same time, this aspect of 
syndication promotes a screening function for the new investor:  the new 
investor may use the willingness of existing investors to co-invest as a 
signal of the companys perceived quality among its existing investors.65 
B.  Limitations of the Traditional Model 
Although the traditional agency cost model explains many prominent 
features of VC contracting, it omits much.  Indeed, adherents of the model 
have themselves noted that real world VC contracts are more complex 
than the model predicts.66  To date, however, no one has sought to depart 
from the standard account of VC investment to examine whether these 
unexplained complexities stem from a common investment problem 
unrelated to investor-manager conflicts.  In particular, the fact that multiple 
VC investors jointly invest in the same start-up company might suggest the 
potential for inter-investor conflicts in the same way that shareholder-
shareholder conflicts routinely bedevil other closely-held corporations.  Yet 
even where scholars have recognized the possibility that investor conflicts 
may exist, they have assumed away these conflicts to simplify their analysis 
of investor-manager agency problems.67  By relaxing this assumption, 
however, it becomes possible to identify a number of unexplained features 
                                                
62 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 261. 
63 See id. at 261-66. 
64 See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 66. 
65 See id. at 67.  While each of the aforementioned contracting techniques helps VC investors minimize 
agency risk, they also give rise to the possibility that the venture capitalist may use the contract rights 
opportunistically to extract concessions from management.  Most commentators that have examined this 
issue generally conclude that reputational concerns likely constrain an investor from acting 
opportunistically towards management.  See PAUL GOMPERS AND JOSH LERNER, THE MONEY OF 
INVENTION:  HOW VENTURE CAPITAL CRATES NEW WEALTH 12 (2001).  The intuition is that a VC 
investor who acts opportunistically towards management in one company will obtain a reputation for 
opportunism among other managers.  This could result in the VC investor receiving fewer invitations 
from managers to finance promising companies, particularly in a community of venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs known for its small size and geographic concentration.  See id. at 31-32; but see infra 
TAN 205-207 (noting the significant growth and fluidity of the VC community). 
66 Kaplan and Strömberg, supra note 10, at 307-308. 
67 See supra TAN 10. 
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of VC contracting that might very well exist because of the potential for 
inter-investor conflicts. 
One need not look far to find these common, unexplained features.  For 
instance, the VC practitioner literature is replete with articles discussing a 
contracting provision called a pay-to-play.68  A pay-to-play penalizes a 
companys existing VC investors who fail to participate at a pre-specified 
amount in a subsequent stage of a companys financing.  The penalty 
ordinarily consists of the loss of certain preferential rights (such as an 
investors antidilution protection) but may also consist of the automatic 
conversion of a non-participating investors preferred stock into common 
stock, thereby stripping the investor of all preferential rights.69   
To date, neither financial economists nor legal academics have analyzed 
this provisiona peculiar result given that it impairs a VC investors ability 
to control investor-manager agency risk through staged financing.  
Arguably, the provision would be consistent with the traditional agency 
costs model if managers demanded the provision to protect themselves 
against potential opportunism by VC investors.70  Yet a pay-to-play 
provision applies only if a sufficient number of a companys VC investors 
approve a financingapproval by the companys management is irrelevant.  
Moreover, in practice it is VC investors and not managers who typically 
demand the term.  In a discussion of [venture capital] terms that really 
matter, the managing director of one prominent VC firm explains why: 
When our co-investors push back on this term, we ask: Why? Are 
you not going to fund the company in the future if other investors 
agree to?   A pay-to-play term insures that all the investors agree 
in advance to the rules of engagement concerning participating in 
future financings.71 
The traditional agency cost model fails to explain why it is necessary to 
establish these rules of engagement with other investors or why VC 
investors might differ with regard to participating in future financings.  
Similarly, the traditional agency cost model says little about why a 
companys VC investors would routinely bargain with each other over the 
distribution of preferred stock rights among investors participating in its 
different stages of financing.  Indeed, adherents of the traditional model 
commonly ignore the fact that start-up companies frequently grant different 
preferential rights to its investors at each stage of financing.72  Those 
                                                
68 See, e.g., John LeClaire, WatchMark Ruling Clarifies Pay-To-Play, VENTURE CAP. J., April 1, 2005 
(noting that [r]ecent times have seen a surge in the use of pay-to-play techniques in private company 
financing rounds); Colin Blaydon & Michael Horvath, Bury the Ratchet, VENTURE CAP. J., January 1, 
2002 (discussing pay-to-play). 
69 For an example of a pay-to-play provision, see the NVCA Model Charter, supra note 51, at 32-34. 
70 Cf. note 65. 
71 Brad Feld, Term Sheet:  Pay-To-Play, Feld Thoughts (March 22, 2005), 
http://www.feld.com/blog/archives/2005/03/term_sheet_payt.html (last visited January 21, 2006).  
72 For instance, in their highly influential work on VC contracting, Ronald Gilson and David Schizer use 
a single-stage investment framework to demonstrate how U.S. tax laws encourage the use of preferred 
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commentators who have studied the issuance of preferred stock over 
multiple stages have tended to focus on the different agency costs and 
information asymmetries VC investors seek to control at each stage.  For 
instance, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner have found that VC investors in 
late-stage financings permit more time to elapse between a companys 
financing stages, as later-stage companies tend to demonstrate fewer agency 
risks and therefore require less monitoring by VC investors.73  Conversely, 
Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg have argued that VC investors increase 
their cash flow and control rights over financing rounds because VC 
investors demand from managers more equity and control as compensation 
for providing additional funding.74  Each study analyzed a companys VC 
investors as a homogenous whole; therefore, none studied the way in which 
these stage-specific rights might affect relations among a companys VC 
investors. 
Yet even a cursory look at several recent VC investments reveals that 
much of the complexity of VC contracting stems from the allocation of 
preferential rights among a companys VC investors.  Between January 1, 
2001 and December 31, 2004, 142 U.S. start-up companies completed an 
IPO after having completed more than one round of VC financing.75  
Analysis of these companies capitalization history reveals a typical capital 
structure that is considerably more complex than that ordinarily depicted in 
the traditional agency cost model.  As predicted by the model, 132 (93%) of 
the companies in the sample issued preferred stock to their VC investors.  
What is universally ignored in the model, however, is the fact for 116 (88%) 
of these companies, the preferred stock was issued in more than one series 
(e.g., Series A, Series B, etc.).   
Examination of these different series of preferred stock reveals real 
economic differences in their terms.  An example appears with FormFactor, 
                                                                                                             
stock in the VC industry.  Their framework depicts a VC investor making a $1 million investment in a 
start-up company in which the investor receives the preferred stock rights described in Part II(A).  After 
demonstrating the limited economic significance of these preferential rights, Gilson and Schizer argue 
that U.S. tax authorities nevertheless respect these formal economic rights and would allow the start-up 
company to report a lower valuation for the companys common stock because of them.  This low 
valuation, in turn, permits the issuance of cheap common stock to company managers, allowing them 
to report any appreciation in the stock as (lower-taxed) capital gains rather than (higher-taxed) ordinary 
income.  See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 18, at 889-909.  As with most proponents of the traditional 
agency cost model, however, Gilson and Schizer refrain from analyzing how the issuance of preferred 
stock in multiple stages of financing might affect the economic significance of a companys preferred 
stock.  As discussed in Part V, the issuance of multiple series of preferred stock over time can result in 
truly worthless common stock. 
73 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 183-192. 
74 Kaplan and Strömberg, supra note 10, at 313. 
75 This sample was obtained through a database of VC financings maintained by Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC).  Information concerning each companys capitalization history was obtained by 
examining the companys registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).  Companies organized outside the United States (or that have their headquarters outside the 
United States) were excluded from the sample on the basis that non-US securities regulations and tax 
laws often prevent these issuers from issuing preferred stock.  Also excluded are companies for which no 
registration statement was available. 
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Inc., a start-up company that completed its IPO in 2003 and whose 
registration statement contained a large amount of information concerning 
its prior VC financings.76  From 1996 through 2001, FormFactor conducted 
seven stages of financing, issuing a separate series of preferred stock at each 
stage beginning with Series A Preferred Stock and ending with Series G 
Preferred Stock.  FormFactors VC contracts reflect clear bargaining 
among its VC investors over the distribution of preferred stock rights among 
these different series.  For instance, with regard to liquidation preferences, 
proceeds of a liquidation or acquisition of FormFactor were to be distributed 
in the following order:77   
 
If, as the traditional agency cost model suggests, liquidation preferences 
are about managing investor-manager conflicts, why would VC investors so 
carefully structure this hierarchy of payouts among the different series?  
Regardless of the order in which preferences are paid, the liquidation 
preferences should have the same incentive effect on managers who hold 
common stock, the most junior security.  Likewise, significant bargaining 
appears to have occurred with regard to which series of preferred stock 
would be entitled to elect investor-representatives to the board of 
directors.78  The negotiated arrangement of board representation is in 
marked contrast to the description of VC investors board rights found in 
VC scholarship where VC investors are analyzed collectively to determine 
the extent to which they control the board of directors.79  If FormFactors 
VC investors were uniformly aligned in their interest to maximize wealth, 
why would they create this complicated structure of board representation?  
FormFactors charter also makes clear that when a companys later-stage 
                                                
76 Data concerning FormFactors VC financings was obtained from the financial statements and exhibits 
included as part of its S-1 Registration Statement.  See FormFactor, Inc., Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1 
(filed with SEC June 11, 2003)[hereinafter FormFactor Registration Statement].   
77 See id. at F-17F-18. 
78 Under FormFactors charter, one director was to be elected by holders of a majority of the Series B 
Preferred Stock; one director by holders of 70% of the Series D Preferred Stock; two directors by the 
holders of the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock (voting together on an as-converted basis); 
and one director by the holders of Common Stock and all Preferred Stock (voting together on an as-
converted basis).  See FormFactor, Form S-1, Exh. 3.01, at 6. [hereinafter FormFactor Certificate]. 
79 See supra TAN 49. 
Payment Priority Recipient: 
First $76,000,000 of proceeds Holders of Series D  Series G 
Preferred Stock 
Next $13,000,000 of proceeds Holders of Series B and Series C 
Preferred Stock 
Next $270,898 of proceeds Holders of Series A Preferred 
Stock 
Any remaining proceeds Holders of Series A Preferred 
Stock and Common Stock 
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VC investors received special preferential rights, older preferred series did 
not necessarily receive the benefit of these new rights.  For instance, only 
the holders of FormFactors Series D through and Series G Preferred Stock 
were entitled to antidilution protection.  To the extent different VC investors 
hold different amounts of the companys seven series of preferred stock, 
what types of inter-investor conflicts are created by the distribution of these 
preferential rights?   
Lastly, the traditional agency costs model does little to explain the 
several lawsuits commenced by VC investors in recent years against other 
VC investors involving a joint start-up company investment.  The economic 
downturn following the turn of the century led to a variety of lawsuits 
against VC investors concerning their investments in start-up companies.80 
Most of these cases involved suits by managers against a companys VC 
investors, often alleging that VC investors opportunistically utilized 
preferential rights to effect self-dealing transactions.81  In many of the cases, 
however, the plaintiffs have been VC investors seeking redress against their 
co-investors in a start-up company.  Given the potential for VC investor 
opportunism created by investors contract rights described in Part II(A),82 
the traditional agency costs model readily explains why a manager might 
bring suit against VC investors.  However, no analytical framework exists to 
explain the reasons why a VC investor might initiate a lawsuit against a 
fellow VC investor over a start-up company investment.  To better 
understand the structure of VC finance and its concomitant challenges for 
VC investors, a more nuanced model of VC investment is required.  
 
III.  A DYNAMIC AGENCY COST MODEL OF VC INVESTMENT 
By relaxing the assumption that a companys VC investors act as a 
unified whole, it is possible to modify the traditional agency cost model of 
VC investment to account for several unexplained features of VC finance.  
Under this modified model, VC contracts reflect not only VC investors 
attempts to address investor-manager conflicts but also the conflicts that 
arise among a companys VC investors.  Indeed, as shown below, the very 
contract provisions that address conflicts with a companys managers create 
the potential for inter-investor conflict.  
Before proceeding further, it is useful to clarify how an inter-investor 
conflict can exist among a companys investors.  In general, an inter-
investor conflict can arise whenever a company action stands to benefit or 
cost one investor in a manner that is different from the benefit or cost 
realized by another investor.  For example, where a start-up company 
                                                
80 In a 2002 survey of court filings, the Venture Capital Journal identified fourteen recent or active 
lawsuits involving VCs.  Charles Fellers, VCs Mired in Litigation of Their Own Making, VENTURE 
CAP. J., November 1, 2002. 
81 For instance, of the lawsuits identified by the Venture Capital Journal, most were suits by company 
founders against VC investors; five involved inter-investor lawsuits concerning a VC financing.  See id. 
82 See note 65. 
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receives equity financing from investors with differing investment 
objectives, the interests of the investors with respect to certain company 
actions may differ.  A venture capital division of a public corporation, for 
instance, may co-invest with traditional VC investors in a company with 
which the public corporation has a strategic relationship.83  In the event a 
competitor of the public corporation seeks to acquire the company, the 
interests of the corporate investor will undoubtedly differ from those of the 
companys traditional VC investors.  While the corporate VC investor may 
object to the acquisition for competitive reasons, the other VC investors will 
desire the acquisition if it results in a significant return on their 
investment.84 
Although these direct inter-investor conflicts exist in certain contexts, 
the focus of this Article is on a more subtle and pervasive form of inter-
investor conflict that exists among even traditional VC investors.  Two 
features of virtually all VC funds, when combined with the techniques 
venture capitalists use to manage agency risk with managers, give rise to 
these conflicts.  Both features stem from the attempt by limited partners 
(LPs)85 in a VC fund to protect against the risk that a venture capitalist 
will himself be a poor agent of the LPs.   
First, VC funds are constrained with respect to both time and capital in 
their start-up company investments (the capital/time investment constraint).  
Venture capital funds are limited in duration (funds ordinarily have a ten-
year life) and have a limited amount of capital with which to make 
investments.86  By imposing these limitations, LPs minimize their downside 
risk if they invest in a poorly performing fund, and they also create a strong 
performance incentive for the venture capitalist.  Only by posting acceptable 
returns for a fund will a venture capitalist be able to market future funds to 
LPs and thereby continue in business.87 
Second, in addition to these implicit incentives, VC funds provide 
explicit incentives for a venture capitalist to achieve positive investment 
returns (the investment return incentives).  Specifically, a venture 
capitalists incentive compensation (or carried interest) creates a powerful 
                                                
83 During 2003, corporate VC investors accounted for direct investments of $1.1 billion, or 6.3% of all 
VC investments. See NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 2004 at 38 [hereinafter, 
NVCA Yearbook]. 
84 To prevent a corporate investor from blocking such a transaction, venture capitalists require corporate 
VC investors to sign a drag-along agreement, in which an investor agrees to vote for any acquisition 
that is approved by stockholders holding a specified amount of preferred stock.  See, e.g., NVCA, Model 
Voting Agreement at 4 available at http://www.nvca.org/model_documents/model_docs.html (providing 
for drag-along right). 
85 VC funds are generally organized as limited partnerships. See David Rosenberg, Venture Capital 
Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 365 (2002).  In 
the interest of simplicity, this Article will use the term limited partners or LPs when referring to 
investors in these funds.   
86 See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 489-91. 
87 A number of studies have examined the manner in which the capital/time investment constraint 
provides a powerful incentive for venture capitalists to produce profits [on VC funds]. Rosenberg, 
supra note 87, at 396.  For a summary of this scholarship, see id. at 394-98. 
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incentive to focus on posting positive returns for each VC fund.  The carried 
interest ordinarily entitles a venture capitalist to receive a specified 
percentage (commonly 20%) of a funds realized profits.88  As a result, the 
primary means for a venture capitalist to share in the success of the fund is 
to achieve a net positive return on the funds start-up company investments. 
The capital/time investment constraint and the investment return 
incentives contribute to the formation of inter-investor conflicts in the 
following manner.  First, the capital/time investment constraint ensures that 
VC investors will hold different amounts of a companys preferred 
securities that are issued at each stage of financing owing to investment 
syndication and the staging of investments.  Next, because these securities 
are commonly issued at different prices at each stage of financing, the 
capital/time investment constraint and the investment return incentives 
encourage a companys VC investors to develop conflicting interests 
concerning the price at which it should sell these securities through a 
company exit event and the price at which the company should issue 
securities in the future.  The fact that these securities are issued at different 
times may also create conflicts among a companys investors due to the 
capital/time investment constraint:  investors who purchase securities in 
earlier stages of financing may be more limited in their ability to support the 
company in future financings or to wait for an acceptable exit event. 
That VC investors appreciate these potential conflicts becomes readily 
apparent in examining VC contracts.  This is especially true with regard to 
contract provisions concerning exit events and future financings where the 
potential for conflict is at its greatest.  Yet as shown below, these carefully 
negotiated provisions are at best imperfect solutions to resolving inter-
investor conflict and may even accentuate inter-investor conflict in certain 
circumstances.  Indeed, it is this underlying imperfection in VC contracting 
that laid the foundation for the inter-investor disputes that occurred 
following the economic downturn in 2001.   
Before turning to these contract provisions and the conflicts they 
address, however, it is first necessary to understand how the combination of 
staged investment and investment syndication leads a companys VC 
investors to acquire over time different amounts of a companys differently-
priced securities. 
A.  The Economics of Staged Investment and Investment Syndication:  
An Example  
Assume EarlyFund, a VC investor, has agreed to invest $5,000,000 in 
NewCo, a newly-formed start-up company.  As an initial matter, EarlyFund 
and NewCo must determine the companys valuation following this 
agreement.89  The valuation will determine the amount of the company 
                                                
88 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 57-70. 
89 See Brad Feld, Venture Capital Deal Algebra, Feld Thoughts (July 7, 2004), 
http://www.feld.com/blog/archives/2004/07/venture_capital.html (last visited January 21, 2006). 
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purchased by EarlyFund and, consequently, the extent to which the new 
capital infusion reduces or dilutes the ownership interest of NewCos 
existing stockholders.  For instance, assuming EarlyFund values NewCo at 
$10,000,000, EarlyFunds $5,000,000 investment will purchase equity 
representing 33.3% of NewCos ownership (i.e., $5,000,000 investment / 
($10,000,000 valuation + $5,000,000 investment)).90  The ownership 
interest of NewCos existing stockholders will correspondingly be reduced 
from 100% to 66.6%. 
EarlyFund and NewCo will use the valuation to determine the price per 
share of the preferred stock issued to EarlyFund in the financing.  To 
calculate this price, the valuation must be divided by NewCos total number 
of shares of common stock outstanding.91  Assuming there are 10,000,000 
shares of common stock outstanding, a $10,000,000 valuation yields a price 
per share of $1.00 (i.e., $10,000,000 valuation / 10,000,000 shares).  
NewCo will therefore issue to EarlyFund 5,000,000 shares of preferred 
stock at $1.00 per share in exchange for EarlyFunds $5,000,000 
investment.   
Once established, the $1.00 price per share determines a number of 
economic rights provided to EarlyFund.  For instance, assuming EarlyFund 
negotiates a liquidation preference, each share of preferred stock will be 
entitled to a specified dollar amount per share prior to any payment on the 
companys common stock in the event of NewCos liquidation or 
acquisition.  Traditionally, this dollar amount would equal the per share 
price paid by EarlyFund, or $1.00.92  Similarly, EarlyFund may negotiate 
antidilution protection to protect itself against the dilution that will occur 
if NewCo issues lower-priced stock in the future.  If negotiated, the 
preferred stock will contain antidilution protection that applies only if 
NewCo issues stock in the future at a price below $1.00 per share.93  
As NewCo undergoes additional rounds of staged financing, the 
economic rights negotiated in each stage will similarly be tied to the price 
per share of the preferred stock sold.  Obviously, if the price of preferred 
stock changes in each financing, tracking these preferred stock rights can 
                                                
90 In contrast, if EarlyFund values NewCo at $15,000,000, it would purchase equity representing only 
25% of NewCos ownership (i.e., $5,000,000 investment / ($15,000,000 valuation + $5,000,000 
investment)). 
91 For this purpose, the number shares of common stock outstanding ordinarily includes the number of 
shares of common stock that may be issued contingently, such as shares reserved for issuance under a 
stock option plan and shares that may be issued upon conversion of outstanding shares of preferred 
stock.  The definition of common stock outstanding for this equation is often highly negotiated 
between a VC investor and a start-up company.  In particular, differences may arise concerning the 
treatment of contingent rights (such as warrants to purchase common stock or a proposed option plan 
increase).  A VC investor may argue that all contingent issuances be included in the number of shares of 
common stock outstanding, thereby decreasing the price per share and increasing the percentage of the 
company purchased in the new financing. 
92 See Lee F. Benton et al., Hi-Tech Corporation: Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, in 
1 VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 8-1, 8-13 (Michael J. Halloran et al. eds, 3d 
Supp. 2004) [herinafter Hi-Tech Charter]. 
93 For a description of antidilution protection, see infra TAN 138. 
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become quite complicated.  As a result, the preferred stock authorized by 
NewCo will consist of a special series of preferred stock to segregate the 
rights of EarlyFund from the preferred stock rights of future investors.  As 
this is NewCos first round of financing, we will assume it adopts the 
common industry practice of authorizing a new series of Series A 
Preferred Stock to sell to EarlyFund.94 
One year later, assume NewCo has successfully met its financial 
projections and is in need of additional financing.  In consultation with 
EarlyFund, NewCos managers determine that an additional $10,000,000 of 
capital is required to complete NewCos product development.  Through the 
assistance of EarlyFund, NewCo identifies a new VC investor, LaterFund, 
to lead this Series B financing.  Although LaterFund will be the lead VC 
investor, EarlyFund also agrees to purchase its pro rata share in the Series 
B financing, or 33% of the $10,000,000 offering.95  As discussed above, this 
commitment assures LaterFund that EarlyFund supports the companys 
business.  The commitment also allows EarlyFund to maintain a significant 
equity position in a company that is successfully executing its business plan.   
As in the Series A financing, NewCo and LaterFund must negotiate the 
valuation of NewCo for the Series B financing.  Given that NewCo has 
successfully met its financial projections, LaterFund agrees to a higher 
valuation of $30,000,000.  Assuming NewCo has not issued stock since its 
last financing, this new valuation results in a price per share of $2.00.96  In 
addition, LaterFund, like EarlyFund in the Series A financing, will demand 
that it purchase preferred stock in the financing to protect against potential 
agency risks.  NewCo will therefore create a new class of Series B 
Preferred Stock to sell in the financing.  As before, its terms will reflect the 
economic rights negotiated by LaterFund and will be tied to the $2.00 price 
per share.  For example, if LaterFund negotiates the same liquidation 
preference provided to EarlyFund, each share of Series B Preferred Stock 
will be entitled to receive $2.00 per share prior to any payment on the 
companys common stock in the event of the companys liquidation or 
acquisition.  Likewise, the Series B antidilution protection will apply only if 
the company issues stock at a price that is less than $2.00 per share. 
                                                
94 See Hi-Tech Charter, supra note 92, at 8-13. 
95 Several studies have examined the tendency of VC investors to purchase their pro-rata share of a 
later-stage offering.  See Lerner, supra note 61, at 23-24 (examining tendency of VC investors to 
purchase their pro-rata share in follow-on financings); Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 15, at 373-74 
(1994) (offering formal model for why VC investors tend to purchase their pro rata share in follow-on 
rounds of financing).  For purposes of this example, EarlyFunds pro-rata share is defined to mean the 
amount that keeps its ownership stake in NewCo the same as before the financing.  In actuality, the 
definition of pro rata share can be a subject of headed debate among a companys investors.  See Seth 
Levine, What Does Pro-Rata Mean?, Feld Thoughts (Sept. 3, 2004). 
96 As in the initial financing, the price per share is determined by dividing the pre-money valuation 
(here, $30,000,000) by the total number of shares of common stock outstanding calculated on an as-
converted-to-common-stock basis.  See infra note 91.  NewCo has outstanding 10,000,000 shares of 
common stock and 5,000,000 shares of preferred stock, resulting in a total of 15,000,000 outstanding 
shares on an as-converted-to-common-stock basis. 
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Given EarlyFunds commitment to purchase its pro rata share, 
EarlyFund will purchase 1,666,667 shares of Series B Preferred Stock for 
approximately $3,333,333.  LaterFund will purchase the remaining 
3,333,333 shares for approximately $6,666,666.  After the financing, the 
companys stockholders will therefore hold the following securities: 
 
As shown in this example, the combination of staged investing and 
syndication results in EarlyFund and LaterFund holding significantly 
different amounts of the differently-priced Series A and Series B Preferred 
Stock.  Three factors typical of VC investment contributed to this outcome. 
First, NewCos valuation changed from the Series A financing to the 
Series B financing.  A fundamental principle of VC investment is that the 
valuation of a company successfully meeting its milestones will increase at 
each stage of financing.97  Conversely, a company failing to meet its 
milestones will experience a decline in valuation. 
Second, LaterFund missed the opportunity to purchase securities at the 
Series A valuation; if it wanted to invest in the company, it could purchase 
only the Series B Preferred Stock at $2.00 per share.  This is an obvious 
consequence of syndication.  Each new investor will be limited to 
purchasing securities with a purchase price reflecting the current company 
valuation.  In general, this means that new investors buy a new and 
differently-priced security than a companys existing investors hold. 
Lastly, LaterFund invested significantly more in the Series B financing 
than EarlyFund.  A new investor commonly requires a company to offer it a 
significant portion of the later-round financing to ensure that it acquires a 
meaningful financial stake in the company.98  Moreover, as the example 
                                                
97 Prominent venture capitalists Alan Salzman (of VantagePoint Venture Partners) and John Doerr (of 
Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield & Byers) note, [i]f a company is successful accomplishing and moving 
through it development cycle, it should be able to raise capital less expensively (i.e., achieve a higher 
company valuation) as time and success progress and the company is able to accomplish the removal or 
significant reduction of major business risks. Alan Salzman and John Doerr, The Venture Financing 
Process, in START-UP & EMERGING COMPANIES at §7.03 (Richard D. Harroch ed., 1998). 
98 For this reason, a companys VC investors routinely waive their contractual preemptive rights in each 
round of financing in order to permit new investors to purchase a larger share of the financing round.  
See Jay Hachigian and Brooks Stough, Venture Capital: Key Issues in Follow-On Financing Rounds in 
35TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 193, 221-22 (Practicing Law Inst. Course 
Handbook Series No. 1396, 2003).  Preemptive rights generally entitle the companys VC investors to 
purchase their pro rata share of any new securities issued by a start-up company.  Absent a waiver of 
these rights, it may not be possible to issue securities in significant amounts to new investors. 
 Series A  
Preferred Stock: 
Series B 
Preferred Stock: Common Stock: Total: 
Stockholder: Shares % Shares % Shares % Shares % 
EarlyFund 5,000,000 100% 1,666,667 33.3% 0 0% 6,666,667 33.3% 
LaterFund 0 0% 3,333,333 66.6% 0 0% 3,333,333 16.7% 
Founders 0 0% 0 0% 10,000,000 100% 10,000,000 50.0% 
Total: 5,000,000 100% 5,000,000 100% 10,000,000 100% 20,000,000 100% 
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illustrates, differential share ownership results even with full pro-rata 
participation by EarlyFund.  Assuming no additional shares of common 
stock are issued by NewCo and full pro rata participation by EarlyFund and 
LaterFund in future financings, EarlyFund will always hold 33.3% of any 
new issuance (but 100% of the Series A Preferred Stock) while LaterFund 
will hold 16.7% of any new issuance (but 66.6% of the Series B Preferred 
Stock).   
In actuality, a number of factors cause VC investors to participate at less 
than their original pro-rata share in future stages of financing.  As a matter 
of simple mathematics, a VC investors pro rata share will ordinarily 
decrease as a company matures.  When NewCo hires additional employees 
to execute its business plan, it will generally compensate these employees 
with equity, thereby requiring the issuance of additional shares of common 
stock or common stock options.99  As NewCo issues new common stock, 
the percentage ownership of EarlyFund and LaterFund will automatically 
decrease, causing a concomitant decrease in their respective pro rata shares 
of future offerings.100    
In addition, a VC fund will ordinarily have a number of structural 
limitations in its ability to participate in future financings.  For one, the 
capital/time investment constraint provides a practical limit on whether an 
investor can invest in a future financing.  When a VC investor makes an 
initial investment in a start-up company, it allocates a reserve for follow-
on investments that it must spread over all future financings.  The size of 
this reserve is seldom more than the size of the original investment,101 
commonly resulting in a reduction in the size of each follow-on investment.  
More importantly, if a fund under-allocates the amount of capital it needs 
for follow-on investments, the fund may run out of capital to support further 
investments in its portfolio.102  A VC fund may also have limitations in its 
partnership agreement regarding the extent it may participate in future 
                                                
99 See supra Part II(A)(2).   
100 For instance, if after the Series B Financing, NewCo adopted a stock option plan consisting of 
10,000,000 shares, EarlyFunds pro rata share of future financings would decrease to 22.2% (6,666,667 / 
30,000,000), and LaterFunds pro rata share would decrease to 11.1% (3,333,333 / 30,000,000). 
101 Prior to the 2001-2003 economic downturn, venture capitalists would often use a fifty-fifty or even a 
two-thirds/one-third principle for determining the size of a follow-on reserve.  For example, a two-
thirds/one-third principle would require two-thirds of a funds committed capital being allocated to new 
investments and one-third to all follow-on investments. See Carolina Braunschweig, Staying Afloat: VCs 
Raise Annex Funds to Buoy Waning Portfolios, VENTURE CAP. J., August 1, 2001.  Later-stage funds 
have historically allocated even less amounts to follow-on financings.  See, e.g., Robyn Kurdek, FTV 
Banks $423M For Second Fund, PRIVATE EQUITY WEEK, January 14, 2002 (noting that FTV, a later 
stage investor, reserved significantly less than 50% of the capital  for follow-on financings). 
102 Under-allocation for follow-on financings became a widespread problem during the 2001-2003 
economic downturn.  The tendency of VC investors to allocate most of their capital towards initial 
investments resulted in many funds having to raise annex funds in 2001 and 2002 for the specific 
purpose of providing follow-on financing to start-up companies.  During this time, venture-backed 
companies were unable to achieve exit events due to the lackluster financial markets.  When companies 
were unable to raise financing from outside sources, existing investors were required to provide the 
much-needed capital, thereby putting significant stress on the traditional model for allocating reserves.  
See Braunschweig, supra note 101, at 3. 
 MANAGING RISK ON A $25 MILLION BET 25 
financings.  For instance, VC fund partnership agreements commonly have 
investment limitations that restrict the amount of capital a fund is permitted 
to invest in any one company.103     
Even without these structural constraints, limiting a funds investment to 
primarily early or later rounds of financing may be an important component 
of satisfying a funds investment purpose.  Venture capital firms routinely 
market themselves to companies and LPs as focusing on either early stage 
or late stage investments.104   For LPs, the distinction is of significant 
importance in understanding a VC firms risk profile, and a VC investor 
may be weary of justifying to its LPs a significant departure from its stated 
investment objective.  Thus, for any of these reasons, a companys existing 
VC investors often invest less in a new round of financing than investors 
leading the round.   
Once again, FormFactor provides a true-life example of the manner in 
which a companys VC investors will hold differing combinations of a 
companys differently-priced securities.  Formed in 1993, FormFactor 
received its first VC investment in 1996 when Mohr Davidow Ventures 
(MDV), an early stage venture capital firm,105 purchased 3,390,822 
shares of Series B Preferred Stock at a price of $0.87, for a total investment 
of nearly $3,000,000.106  The companys next round of VC financing 
occurred in 1996 when it sold 3,298,161 shares of Series C Preferred Stock 
at $1.65 per share, of which MDV purchased 37% for approximately 
$2,000,000.  A new expansion stage VC investor,107 Institutional Venture 
Partners (IVP), led this round of financing and purchased 55% of the 
shares sold for $3,000,000.108  Between 1997 and 1998, the company sold 
5,552,973 shares of Series D Preferred Stock at $3.45 for gross proceeds of 
almost $20,000,000.  Of this amount, MDV and IVP each purchased only 
434,783 shares (7.5% of the offering) in exchange for investments of 
$1,500,000 each.  New investors Intel Corporation and later-stage VC 
investor Morgan Stanley Venture Partners (MSVP)109 provided the 
majority of the investment, with Intel investing approximately $5,000,000 
and MSVP investing approximately $7,000,000.   
Following these financings, the companys three primary VC investors 
significantly curtailed their investments.  In its Series E financing in 1999, 
FormFactor raised $20,000,000 by selling 2,666,666 shares of Series E 
                                                
103 See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 70. 
104 See, e.g., infra notes 105, 109. 
105 MDV website at www.mdv.com. 
106 General information concerning FormFactors financing history was obtained from the financial 
statements included as part of FormFactors S-1 Registration Statement.  See supra note 76.  Information 
concerning individual holdings of VC investors was obtained from the companys Sixth Amended and 
Restated Rights Agreement.  See FormFactor, Inc., Form S-1, Exh. 4.02 (Apr. 22, 2002).  FormFactor 
had previously raised $349,000 from management in 1995 by selling shares of Series A Preferred Stock 
at $0.05 per share.  See id. 
107 IVP website, at http://www.ivp.com/. 
108 See FormFactor Registration Statement, at F-17F-18. 
109 See MSVP website, at www.morganstanley.com/institutional/ venturepartners/faq.html?page=faq. 
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Preferred Stock at a price of $7.50 per share.  A group of the companys 
strategic partners led the financing; MDV, IVP and MSVP collectively 
invested only $849,000 in this round (4% of the offering).110  MDV, IVP 
and MSVP did not participate at all in the companys subsequent Series F or 
Series G financings in 2000 and 2001, respectively.  Instead, a combination 
of individuals and corporations provided the investments by purchasing 
633,130 shares of Series F Preferred Stock at $11.00 per share and 579,672 
shares of Series G Preferred Stock at $15.00 per share.   
Thus, as FormFactor underwent multiple rounds of VC financing, its 
earlier investors significantly diminished their level of participation in each 
subsequent round.  The result was a company capital structure in which 
each VC investor held a different amount of the companys differently-
priced securities.  Having explained how this situation results from staged 
investing and investment syndication, it is now necessary to explain how 
this situation creates the potential for inter-investor conflict.  
B.  Inter-Investor Conflicts 
Differences in investor participation levels in each stage of company 
financing can give rise to a number of potential conflicts among a 
companys VC investors owing to venture capital fund structure.  As this 
section demonstrates, VC investors are clearly aware of these potential 
conflicts and utilize VC contracts at each stage of financing to address them.  
Indeed, for a VC investor and its lawyer, resolving or containing these 
conflicts at each investment stage appears to be just as critical for successful 
VC investment as containing the conflict between managers and investors.  
Although inter-investor conflicts might arise in a variety of contexts,111 the 
two that appear to play the largest role in VC contracts are those relating to 
the companys ultimate exist strategy and the companys future financing. 
1.  Conflicts over Exit Events.  In general, VC investors ordinarily seek 
to exit company investments through one of two principal methods:  the 
sale of shares into the public markets after a companys IPO or an 
acquisition of a company for cash or publicly-traded securities.112  In either 
case, differences in VC investors stock ownership may create differences 
as to what constitutes an acceptable exit event for a company.  As one 
prominent attorney in the industry notes, the actual exit strategy employed 
 may require cooperation from shareholders who will not (or may not) be 
in agreement with the timing, price or other terms as proposed by [a 
particular] VC.113   
                                                
110 MDV invested $349,000; IVP and MSVP each invested $250,000.  See FormFactor Registration 
Statement, at F-17F-18. 
111 See supra TAN 83-81. 
112 See LEVIN, supra note 7, at 9-3. 
113 Id. at 1-11.  The general partners of Blueprint Ventures echo a similar sentiment:  
Certainly, most VCs can recite the IPO or M&A exit strategy for each of their companies.  
But how many VCs agree, inside their partnerships and inside their investment syndicates, on 
an acceptable exit value of their investment?  In many cases we know, venture investors many 
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The source of these differences arises from the potentially different 
investment returns each VC investor in a start-up company will receive on a 
proposed exit.  In FormFactor, for instance, investors who acquired shares 
of the companys Series G Preferred Stock at $15 per share would view less 
favorably a proposed IPO in 2003 at $10 per share than MDV whose 
average price paid per share was $1.34.  MDV would stand to realize at this 
price a total return on investment of almost 650%, or an annual internal rate 
of return (IRR) of approximately 40%.114  In contrast, a stockholder who 
only participated in the Series G financing would realize a total loss of 
-33%, or an annual IRR of approximately -18%.  The extent to which VC 
investors purchase their pro-rata share in each stage of financing does little 
to mitigate the potential for divergent investment returns among VC 
investors.  In the NewCo example, even though EarlyFund purchased its 
pro-rata share of the Series B offering, its average price per share ($1.25) 
was $0.75 less than LaterFunds.  As a result, following the Series B 
financing of NewCo, any acquisition of NewCo that valued the company at 
less than $40,000,000 (or $2.00 per share) but more than $25,000,000 (or 
$1.25 per share) would result in a negative return on investment for 
LaterFund, but a positive return on investment for EarlyFund. 
The structure of the VC market prevents investment cost from ever 
becoming sunk for several reasons.  As a general matter, venture 
capitalists must offer LPs the prospect of significant investment returns in 
order to compensate them for the limited liquidity and significant risks 
associated with start-up investments.  Among early-stage venture capitalists, 
for instance, it is generally assumed that an investment portfolio should 
yield an IRR of approximately 30-50%.115  Moreover, because many of 
these investments will ultimately be written off, each individual investment 
should promise a 40-50% projected IRR after accounting for the venture 
capitalists fees and compensation.116   
VC fund structure further accentuates this concern with investment 
returns owing to the capital/time investment constraint and the investment 
return incentives.  First, the intense pressure to raise successive VC funds 
can encourage a venture capitalist to time exit events so as to accelerate 
positive returns and to delay negative returns.  By exiting an investment 
with a significant return, a VC investor locks in a gain that helps lift the IRR 
of a portfolio likely to contain several losing investments.  For a VC 
                                                                                                             
years into an investment will continue to politely disagree on the ideal exit amount for the 
company. 
Bart Schachter & George Hoyem, What VCs Can Learn from Their Cousins in Buyouts, VENTURE CAP. 
J., Sept. 1, 2004. 
114 In general, an IRR measures the performance of an investment that requires and produces a number of 
cash flows over time.  An IRR is the discount rate that equates the present value of all cash in-flows 
associated with an investment with the sum of the present value of the cash outflows accruing from it 
and its present unrealized value. 
115 See Salzman and Doerr, supra note 97, at §7.02[2]. 
116 See id. 
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investor in the process of raising another fund, these early home runs may 
be critical to attracting LPs.117  Moreover, under the prevailing industry 
valuation standards, VC investors generally carry a company investment at 
cost until an exit event or a subsequent financing.118   IRR calculations will 
therefore be higher the sooner a fund liquidates a successful investment.  
For similar reasons, a VC investor faced with a losing investment may 
present a healthier picture of its overall portfolio to its current and 
prospective LPs by delaying an exit:  an investment valued at cost simply 
looks better to LPs than an investment loss. 
In addition to these marketing pressures, the carried interest also 
encourages venture capitalists to focus on accelerating positive returns and 
delaying negative returns.  As noted above, the carried interest entitles a 
venture capitalist to receive a specified percentage (usually 20%) of the 
profits realized on a funds start-up company investments.119  A corollary of 
the carry is the so-called claw-back provision, which ensures that the 
venture capitalist receives no more than her specified percentage of fund 
profits upon winding-up a fund.  This result can occur where a VC fund 
initially liquidates profitable investments and later liquidates losing 
investmentsa common pattern among VC funds.120  In such situations, the 
claw-back provision requires a venture capitalist to recontribute capital to 
the fund in order to avoid receiving excess compensation.  Consequently, 
the ability of a venture capitalist to realize a profit rather than a loss on an 
investment may potentially mean the difference between receiving an 
incentive payment from the VC fund and having to recontribute capital to 
its LPs.121 
Thus, because of staged investment and syndication, a venture capitalist 
who invests in a start-up company faces a discernable risk that it may 
disagree at some point with the companys other VC investors concerning 
                                                
117 See, e.g., Lawrence Aragon, Harvard Revs Up Ignitions Third Fund, VENTURE CAP. J., December 1, 
2004 (reporting that successful fundraising isnt about who know that counts; its whether you can 
show a return on investment); see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 241 (noting propensity 
among venture capitalists to grandstandtaking a start-up company public as quickly as possibleto 
facilitate fund-raising among LPs). 
118 Most firms have adopted the valuation guidelines that were proposed to, but never adopted by, the 
NVCA in 1989. In general, these guidelines specify that a company investment should be carried at cost 
unless a different value is justified by the last round of financing (if the financing includes a new outside 
investor) or if the company otherwise experiences a material change in financial condition.  See Colin 
Blaydon and Fred Wainwright, The Stage Is Set, PRIVATE EQUITY INTL., May 2004. 
119 See infra TAN 88. 
120 See Steven Franklin and Stig Colberg, Evaluating and Managing a Potential Clawback Liability, 
VENTURE CAP. J., Sept. 1, 2002. 
121 Assume, for instance, a fund makes two investments of $100 each and provides for a 20% carry.  If 
the first investment is sold for $1,000, the fund must first return $100 to LPs as return of capital. 
Thereafter, it may distribute the $900 of profits 80% to LPs ($720) and 20% to the venture capitalist as 
carry ($180).  If the second investment is written-off as worthless, the net profit of the fund will be $800 
(i.e., $1000 - $200), requiring the venture capitalist to recontribute $20 to the LPs to ensure its carried 
interest does not exceed 20% of fund profits.  If the fund had sold the second investment at cost (i.e., 
$100), the net profit of the fund would have been $900 (i.e., $1,100 - $200), thereby avoiding any look-
back liability.  See id. 
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what constitutes a proper exit event.  In the highly volatile start-up markets, 
investors holding higher-priced securities may simply be more willing than 
holders of lower-priced securities to postpone an exit event until the next 
up market.  Moreover, the challenge of achieving investor consensus on 
this issue is made more complicated by the limited life of VC funds.  
Because of the ten-year term of most funds, an early investor who has held 
an investment for several years may face a structural incentive to exit at a 
time when a companys later investors are not subject to these pressures.  A 
companys earlier investors may therefore be less willing to forgo a low-
value exit yielding a return on investment, even if the investors believe the 
company could obtain a higher valuation in the long-term.122 
Given the risk that a companys VC investors may disagree over an 
acceptable exit event, an important aspect of VC contracting centers on 
mechanisms that contain this risk.  In the words of one leading VC lawyer, 
contracts signed at the time of VCs initial investment will generally give 
VC certain future rights to control its exit strategy.  This is especially 
important where VC will not (or may not) control portfolio company at the 
back end when the exit strategy is executed.123 
In the context of an IPO, a VC investor will ordinarily obtain these 
special control rights by demanding a veto right over the completion of an 
IPO at an unacceptably low price per share.  VC investors accomplish this 
by relying on the virtually universal practice among investment bankers 
that, prior to completing an IPO, all shares of a companys preferred stock 
must convert into common stock.124  Because of this industry practice, the 
preferred stock purchased by VC investors will generally have a provision 
requiring the automatic conversion of preferred stock upon either an IPO at 
a pre-specified price-per-share or the requisite vote of preferred 
stockholders.125  For many investors, a condition to making a company 
investment will be setting the automatic conversion price of its preferred 
stock to a price that equals or exceeds its purchase price.  Likewise, with 
regard to an automatic conversion by means of a stockholder vote, VC 
investors commonly seek a special veto right with respect to the conversion 
of its shares of preferred stock.126  As a result of these two provisions, a VC 
investor can block the conversion of its preferred stock on an IPO if the 
offering price is less than the investors purchase price. 
An example of each of these techniques appears in FormFactors 
charter.  Under FormFactors charter, shares of Series A, Series B, Series C 
                                                
122  On the challenges that an early-stage investor faces due to the limited term of a fund, see Ravi 
Chiruvolu, Before You Do That Amazing Biotech Deal, Read this Story, VENTURE CAP. J., December 2, 
2004.  
123 LEVIN, supra note 7, at 1-11. 
124 See Maha Ibrahim, et al., Illustrative Venture Investment Term Sheet, in 35TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON 
SECURITIES REGULATION 193, 221-22 (Practicing Law Inst. Course Handbook Series No. 1396, 2003). 
125 See, e.g., Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 289 (finding automatic conversion provisions in 
95% of the financing rounds examined).   
126 See Hi-Tech Charter, supra note 92, at 8-368-37. 
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and Series D Preferred Stock would automatically convert into common 
stock at an IPO having a price per share of at least $6.90a price well in 
excess of the per share purchase price of each series.  For the higher-priced 
Series E, Series F and Series G Preferred Stock, the minimum IPO price for 
automatic conversion of each series was set at exactly its per share purchase 
price (i.e., $7.50, $11.00 and $15.00, respectively).127  To convert any series 
of FormFactors preferred stock by means of a stockholder vote, it was 
necessary to obtain the approval of two-thirds of the outstanding shares of 
each series.128  
A VC investor will also seek to protect its particular economic 
preferences concerning the price and timing of a company acquisition.  
These protections may take the form of either special veto rights or special 
liquidation preferences.  With regard to veto rights, a VC investor may seek 
specific, class veto rights that guarantee it a blocking right over a 
companys acquisition.  Alternatively, where existing investors already hold 
an approval right over an acquisition, a later-stage investor may seek to 
increase the voting threshold required for approving an acquisition to ensure 
that its vote is required.   
In addition to veto rights, a new VC investor may seek to protect its 
preferences concerning an exit event through a senior liquidation 
preference.  As noted above, a liquidation preference entitles a stockholder 
to a specified preferential return (ordinarily, an investors purchase price) on 
its preferred shares prior to any common stock payments in the event of a 
companys acquisition.129  A senior liquidation preference entitles one VC 
investor to receive its liquidation preference in advance of other VC 
investors.  According to one attorney in the industry, 
The general rule with respect to priorities among multiple rounds of 
preferred stock investments is that of LIFOlast in, first out.  New 
investors in a later-stage company will want to ensure that in the 
event of a redemption or liquidation, their money comes out first.  
Later stage investors are particularly concerned about liquidation 
preferences.130 
Unfortunately, understanding the manner in which VC investors seek to 
protect their particular preferences regarding a companys exit strategy is 
not always easy to discern.  The ability to identify how VC investors resolve 
potential conflicts over a company exit event requires an analysis of VC 
investor stock ownership, as well as an understanding of how voting rights 
and liquidation preferences can work in tandem to create a system of 
reciprocal veto rights.  For instance, a straightforward analysis of 
                                                
127 See FormFactor Certificate, at 5-6. 
128 See id. 
129 See supra TAN 91-93. 
130 Daniel Case & Standish OGrady, An Overview of Venture Capital, in START-UP COMPANIES: 
PLANNING, FINANCING AND OPERATING THE SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS 6.13 (Richard D. Harroch ed., 
1996). 
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FormFactors charter might suggest its VC investors are generally aligned 
in their preference concerning the companys acquisition.  Under its charter, 
the protective provisions provide merely that an acquisition of the company 
must be approved by the holders of a majority of the shares of Series B 
through Series G Preferred Stock.131  However, analysis of the VC 
investors stock ownership reveals a more complicated story:  this voting 
threshold ensured that no acquisition could occur without the collective 
approval of MDV, IVP and MSVP.132   
The voting threshold clearly provided less protection to the Series E 
through Series G investors, as MDV, IVP and MSVP could approve an 
acquisition without their consent.  How did these VC investors protect 
against the risk that MDV, IVP and MSVP would approve a low-value 
acquisition?  The answer is in the liquidation preferences negotiated by 
these investors: the companys charter granted to the holders of Series D 
through G Preferred Stock a senior liquidation preference.  This liquidation 
preference guaranteed that if MDV, IVP and MSVP approved a low-value 
acquisition, no proceeds could be paid on their shares of Series B and Series 
C Preferred Stock until each share of Series D through Series G Preferred 
Stock had been distributed an amount equal to the shares original cost (i.e., 
$3.45, $7.50, $11.00 and $15.00, respectively).  In other words, no VC 
investor was at risk that an acquisition would be approved against its will 
where the investor did not receive back at least its original investment cost.  
As analysis of FormFactors charter reveals, the common use among VC 
investors of series veto rights and liquidation preferences seeks to address a 
fundamental challenge of VC investment.  It is a challenge unrelated to 
concerns about whether managers will act as good agents.  Rather, it is a 
challenge arising from the potentially conflicting interests among VC 
investors concerning what constitutes a proper exit event for a start-up 
company. 
2.  Conflicts over Future Financings.  Additionally, upon investing in a 
start-up company, a VC investor must address the potentially different 
preferences among investors concerning future funding commitments to the 
company and the price at which the company completes a future financing. 
First, a VC investor in a company may have concerns that its co-
investors will be unwilling to provide future financing to the company.  
These concerns are likely to be especially pronounced where the companys 
VC investors have invested at different times due to the capital/time 
investment constraint of VC funds.  In comparison to a late-stage investor, a 
companys early-stage investor may more quickly expend its internal 
                                                
131 See FormFactor Certificate at 14-15.   
132 Theoretically, this voting threshold would also permit an acquisition if approved by MDV and several 
later-stage investors.  However, given the relatively low price per share of IVP and MSVP compared to 
that of the later-stage investors, it seems highly unlikely that any acquisition approved by MDV and a 
coalition of later-stage investors would not also be approved by IVP and MSVP.  
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funding allocation to the company or its fund may simply lack the capital to 
make additional investments.133   
Second, differences in the prices at which a companys VC investors 
acquire their securities may create different sensitivities concerning the 
price at which the company issues securities in the future.  Ordinarily, a VC 
investor will expect its ownership percentage in a start-up company to be 
diluted when the company issues stock to new investors at a higher price 
than the VC investor paid for its own shares.  Although its percentage 
ownership of the company will diminish, the value of the stockholders 
ownership interest will generally be the same or greater after the issuance.  
This is because the higher price stock issuance means that the company has 
a greater enterprise valuation than it did at the time of issuing the existing 
investors lower-priced securities.134 
In contrast, when a company issues stock below the price paid by the 
VC investor, the dilution suffered by the investor is costly for two reasons.  
First, the lower price of the new stock relative to the shares held by the VC 
investor indicates that the value of its investment has decreased since it 
acquired its securities.  As a result, the VC investor may be required to 
report a decrease in the value of its investment in its LP financial reports.135  
Second, the lower price of the new stock will cause the company to sell a 
greater number of shares of preferred stock than the VC investor could have 
purchased with its own investment, thereby diluting the investors 
ownership interest.  Unless the VC investor is willing and able to purchase 
its pro-rata share of the issuance, the dilution may significantly decrease its 
prospective return on investment.  Thus, a holder of primarily lower-priced 
stock will ordinarily hold different preferences than holders of higher-priced 
stock regarding the desirability of the company issuing securities at 
particular prices. 
Given these potentially divergent preferences, a new VC investor will 
often seek contractual rights that protect its particular preferences 
concerning future financings.  With regard to the risk that a companys VC 
investors may stop funding the company in the future, a VC investor may 
seek to implement the pay-to-play provision discussed earlier.136  By 
forcibly stripping the preferred rights of a non-participating investor, a pay-
to-play provides a significant deterrent against failing to participate in a 
financing that triggers the provision.  
With regard to the risk that the company will complete a low-priced 
financing, a VC investor will ordinarily request upon making an investment 
a combination of stockholder veto rights and price-based antidilution 
                                                
133 See supra TAN 101-102. 
134 See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Understanding Price-Based Antidilution Protection:  Five Principles to 
Apply When Negotiating a Down-Round Financing, 59 BUS. LAW. 23, 24-25 (2003).  To maintain their 
pre-financing ownership percentage, VC investors must purchase their pro-rata share of the financing.  
See supra TAN 95. 
135 See supra note 118. 
136 See supra TAN 68-69. 
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protection.  As before, FormFactor provides a concrete illustration of both 
techniques.  FormFactors charter provided that the approval of the holders 
of a majority of the shares of Series B through Series G Preferred Stock 
would be required for the company to authorize or issue any security that 
was senior to or on a parity with the existing preferred stock.137  Analysis of 
the companys stock ownership records indicates that this voting threshold 
effectively gave MDV, IVP and MSVP the collective power to approve (or 
disapprove) a future financing of FormFactor.  As with the veto rights over 
FormFactors acquisition, this voting provision appears to place at risk the 
interests of FormFactors later-stage investors who held higher-priced 
shares of preferred stock.  Given that MDV, IVP and MSVP held relatively 
lower-priced shares, they might approve a financing at a price per share that 
would be unacceptably low to the companys later-stage investors.  These 
later-stage investors might prefer the company negotiate harder for a better 
valuation of the company. 
To protect against this potential conflict, FormFactors later-stage 
investors obtained price-based antidilution protection.  Antidilution 
protection diminishes the dilutive effect of a lower-price stock issuance by 
increasing, upon the issuance of the lower-priced stock, the ratio at which 
each share of the VC investors preferred stock converts into common 
stock.  As a result, the VC investors preferred stock will convert into a 
greater number of shares of common stock than prior to the issuance, and on 
an as-converted-to-common-stock basis, the preferred stockholder will 
suffer less dilution from the new stock issuance than if no adjustment had 
been made.138   In FormFactor, the Series D through Series G Preferred 
Stock each contained weighted-average antidilution protection that was 
tied to the purchase price of each series.  For instance, if the company 
issued stock between $11.00 and $15.00 per share, the Series G Preferred 
Stockand only the Series G Preferred Stockwould receive an increase 
in its common stock conversion rate.  This adjustment would diminish the 
dilutive effect of the stock issuance by allowing the Series G preferred stock 
to convert into more shares of common stock.  Likewise, if the company 
issued stock between $7.50 and $11.00 per share, both the Series F and 
Series G Preferred Stock would receive an antidilution adjustment.  Similar 
adjustments would occur for the Series D and Series E Preferred Stock 
should the company issue stock below their original issuance prices. 
Thus, in contrast to most accounts of VC investment, the specific 
provisions that appear in VC contracts are not just about controlling agency 
                                                
137 See FormFactor Certificate at 14-15.  
138 The extent of the adjustment will depend on the type of antidilution formula given to the preferred 
stock.  For instance, a ratchet formula results in complete price protection against a future issuance of 
lower-priced stock.  Under this formula, the protected investor is placed in the same position upon 
conversion of its preferred stock into common stock as if the investor purchased the shares of underlying 
common stock at the new, lower price.  More mild, weighted-average formulas result in a less extreme 
increase in the conversion rate of the investors preferred stock. For a description of the various 
antidilution formulas, see Bartlett, supra note 134, at 24-26. 
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risks with company managers.  Clearly, VC investors demand special 
contract rights to protect against these agency risks.  But they also demand 
provisions that address the potential conflicts among a companys VC 
investors over the exercise of these contract rights.  VC investors may be in 
agreement that they should have a vote on the sale or financing of a 
company; however, getting them all to agree on what constitutes a proper 
sale or financing is an entirely different matter. 
In describing the manner in which a companys VC investors contain 
potential inter-investor conflicts, it should also be clear that the existing 
system is far from perfect.  The provisions described above do little to 
eliminate the underlying potential for inter-investor disputes.  For instance, 
the senior liquidation preference held by FormFactors later stage investors 
might permit a low-value acquisition proposal to be acceptable to these 
later-stage investors, but unacceptable to MDV, IVP and MSVP who might 
receive little or no proceeds due to this provision.139   
Moreover, the provisions described above might actually increase the 
risk for inter-investor conflict.  Even with a pay-to-play, investors may 
continue to develop divergent opinions regarding the desirability of 
financing a company.  The provision, however, increases the stakes of these 
debates by actively punishing non-participating investors.  Likewise, the use 
of antidilution protection can turn investor preferences regarding the price at 
which a company issues its securities into concrete investor conflicts.  In the 
case of FormFactor, a stock issuance that resulted in an antidilution 
adjustment to the Series G Preferred Stock would have effectively diluted 
all shares of common stock and preferred stock that did not receive an 
adjustment.  For MDV and IVP, an antidilution adjustment of the later-
issued stock would have resulted in a reduction in the value of their primary 
investment in the companys unprotected Series B and Series C Preferred 
Stock.  Arguably, MDV and IVP could protect themselves from this risk 
through exercising their negotiated veto right over company financings, but 
veto rights themselves give rise to the possibility that they might be used 
opportunistically.  Couldnt MDV and IVP threaten to use their veto rights 
to force a waiver of all or part of the later-stage investors preferential 
rights?   
It was these unresolved potential inter-investor conflicts that laid the 
foundation for the unprecedented inter-investor disputes that erupted 
following the collapse of the Internet economy. 
 
IV.  PATHOLOGICAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 2001-2003  
In the months following the collapse of the Internet economy, a 
relatively new investment risk began to concern many venture capitalists:  
                                                
139 Cf. Hachigian and Stough, supra note 98 at 221-22 (noting that because of senior liquidation 
preferences, a situation may arise in which a junior preferred stockholder will not vote for a sale 
transaction yielding less than a certain amount of proceeds because such a transaction would not benefit 
the junior preferred stockholder.). 
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the fear of suit by other VC investors.  Lawsuits against VC investors by 
company managers had occurred in the past, but the notion that a VC 
investor would bring suit against a co-investor in a start-up company was an 
entirely novel phenomenon.  The source of this new risk arose from the 
flawed nature in which VC investors had traditionally resolved potential 
inter-investor conflicts of interest.  In particular, the economic climate 
encouraged a type of company financing in which VC investors leading the 
financing demanded greater preferential rights to protect their economic 
interests at the same time that many of the companys existing VC investors 
were significantly constrained in their ability to participate in the financing.  
These preferential rights drove a wedge between the interests of those VC 
investors who participated and those who did not.   
A.  The Rise of the Down-Round Financing 
The year 2001 represented a significant turning point in the VC industry.  
The first sign of the new economic climate came with the abrupt halt of the 
formerly robust IPO market for start-up companies.  Whereas 264 venture-
backed companies completed an IPO in 2000, by 2001 the number of 
venture-backed IPOs fell to 64, which fell further to 24 in 2002.140  
Likewise, the number of opportunities for start-up companies to exit by 
means of a meaningful acquisition also plummeted.  Although the annual 
number of acquisitions of venture-backed companies was relatively constant 
from 2001 through 2002, the aggregate value of these transactions fell from 
$68.4 billion in 2000 to $16.8 billion in 2001 to $7.9 billion in 2002.141  
(Figure 2) 
 
Given the diminished opportunities for start-up companies to seek 
financing through an IPO or acquisition, companies sought financing 
primarily through VC investment.  Yet, after years of record investment 
levels, VC investors quickly began to return to pre-bubble investment 
trends.  In contrast to the 7,832 VC investments made in 2000 (representing 
a total of $104 billion invested), VC investors made only 4,451 investments 
in 2001 (representing a total of $40 billion invested) and 3,042 investments 
                                                
140 See NVCA, Q3 2005 Exit Poll, (October 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.nvca.org/pdf/2005Q3IPOreleasefinal.pdf. 
141 See Sanjay Subhedar, Relief Is Finally Coming with a Rise in M&A, VENTURE CAP. J., July 1, 2003. 
Figure 2:  Venture-Backed Liquidity Events by Year 

















2000 316 202 $68,353.1 $338.4 264 $25,499.4 
2001 353 165 $16,798.9 $101.8 41 $3,489.9 
2002 316 151 $7,874.4 $52.1 24 $2,473.5 
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in 2002 (representing a total of $21.5 billion).142  Significantly, for most VC 
investors, the bulk of these investments represented follow-on investments 
in existing portfolio companies rather than first-time investments in other 
start-up companies.143  VC investors attributed their reluctance to make new 
first-time investments to the need to engage in time-consuming portfolio 
triagethe resuscitation of failed business plans and the restructuring of 
company cash-flow needs.144  For start-up companies seeking financing, 
finding a new VC investor to lead a financing became increasingly difficult, 
requiring many companies to turn to their existing VC investors for 
continued funding. 
Even when a start-up company could secure VC investmentwhether 
from existing investors or from an outside investorthe terms were likely 
to be severe.  The run-up in IPO valuations during the bubble years of 
1999 and 2000 was accompanied by a concomitant run-up in the valuations 
of private start-up companies.145  After 2000, VC investments in established 
start-up companies represented a marked departure from this trend.  Most 
were completed at a significantly lower valuation than a companys prior 
round of financing.146  As a result, the financings ordinarily triggered VC 
investors antidilution protection.   
The resulting dilution of a prospective down-round financing often 
brought out the divergent interests of a companys managers and its 
multiple VC investors.  Consider, for instance, a down-round financing of 
NewCo following its Series B financing.  Assume that NewCo, in desperate 
need for capital, agreed to a $5,000,000 Series C financing at a $15,000,000 
valuation.  Assume further that EarlyFund and LaterFund each agreed to 
purchase their pro-rata share in the financing  Ordinarily, the holders of 
common stock (presumably management) would see their equity stake in 
NewCo shrink from 50% to 37.5%, while EarlyFund and LaterFund would 
                                                
142 See NVCA, Industry Statistics, available at http://www.nvca.org/ffax.html. 
143 See NVCA, Venture Capital Investments in Q2 2002 Continue To Slide Back Toward Pre-Bubble 
1998 Levels, available at www.nvca.com/nvca07_30_02.html (noting that [f]or every dollar invested in 
a new company, five to seven dollars are invested in existing portfolio companies).  
144 See, e.g., Entrepreneurs Sound Off On Perils of Fund-Raising, VENTURE CAP. J., Jan. 1, 2002 (noting 
that following the tech wreck in 2001, the traditional VCs were either in shock, crying or running 
away or just figuring out what to do with their portfolio.); John J. Egan & Mark Selinger, Down Round 
Doldrums, VENTURE CAP. J., Feb. 1, 2001 ([V]enture financing for start-ups has become increasingly 
scarce as venture capitalists focus on sheparding their existing portfolio companies through this difficult 
financing market.). 
145 See Alistair Christopher, University of Washington, VENTURE CAP. J., May 1, 2001. 
146 Fenwick & West, LLP, a prominent law firm within the VC industry, commenced a quarterly survey 
of VC financing terms in 2002.  According to this survey, the percentage of financings that were 
completed at a valuation lower than a companys prior financing were as follows for each quarter of 
2002:  57%, 52%, 67% and 68%.  See Fenwick & West, LLP, Trends in Legal Terms in Venture 
Financings In the San Francisco Bay Area (Fourth Quarter 2004), available at 
http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/VCSurvey/Q204_VC_Terms_Report.pdf [hereinafter, F&W Survey].  
Anecdotal evidence confirms that down-round financings were equally prevalent during 2001.  See 
Charles R. Fellers, A Rocky Venture Environment Shapes The Legal Landscape, VENTURE CAP. J., Mar. 
1, 2002. 
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see their stakes remain the same at 33.3% and 16.7%, respectively.147  
However, because the financing would trigger the Series A and Series B 
antidilution protection, the equity stake of the common stock would actually 
be reduced to 34.9%, while the equity stakes of EarlyFund and LaterFund 
would increase to 34.3% and 18.2%, respectively.148  Even among 
EarlyFund and LaterFund, the down-round financing would be more costly 
to EarlyFund than to LaterFund due to their different security ownership.  
Although both the Series A Preferred Stock and the Series B Preferred 
Stock would receive an antidilution adjustment, the higher-cost Series B 
Preferred Stock would receive a greater adjustment than the lower-cost 
Series A Preferred Stock.149  As a result, following the antidilution 
adjustments, the percentage increase in LaterFunds equity stake would be 
6% more than the increase in EarlyFunds equity stake.150 
Down-round financings also included a number of preferential terms 
that accentuated the potential conflict between participating VC investors, 
non-participating VC investors and management.  As Figure 3 shows,151 VC 
investors often demanded a variety of preferential rights in down-round 
financings to preserve as much of an economic interest in the company as 
possible after a subsequent round at a lower valuation  at the expense of 
junior preferred holders, common shareholders and option holders.152  
First, VC investors increasingly demanded preferred stock having a 
multiple, senior liquidation preference, often with multiples of up to three or 
four times the original investment cost.153  VC investors also purchased 
more participating convertible preferred stock in lieu of traditional 
convertible preferred stock.  As noted above, traditional preferred stock 
entitles a holder to a preferential payment upon a liquidation or acquisition 
                                                
147 In general, the pre-existing ownership interest of every stockholder would be reduced by 25% (i.e., 
$5,000,000 investment / ($15,000,000 pre-money valuation + $5,000,000 investment)). 
148 Figures relating to NewCos antidilution adjustments are based on antidilution analyses independently 
conducted by the author.  For simplicity, the analyses assume a capitalization of NewCo as it existed 
following the Series B financing.  See supra TAN 95-96.  The antidilution analyses are available upon 
request. 
149 In general, each series of preferred stock will receive an antidilution adjustment based on the 
difference between the original issue price of the series and the price of newly issued stock.  As a result, 
the Series B Preferred Stock (having an issue price of $2.00 per share) will receive a greater antidilution 
adjustment than the lower-priced Series A Preferred Stock (having an issue price of $1.00 per share).  
For an analysis of this issue, see Bartlett, supra note 134, at 33. 
150 The divergent effect of the financing on EarlyFund and LaterFund is especially clear where the price 
of the down-round financing results in an antidilution adjustment to the Series B Preferred Stock but not 
to the Series A Preferred Stock.  For instance, had the pre-money valuation of NewCo been $25,000,000, 
EarlyFunds equity stake (even with full pro rata participation) would decrease from 33.3% to 33.28%, 
while LaterFunds equity stake would increase from 16.67% to 17.38%. 
151 Figure 3 is derived from the F&W Survey. 
152 Stephen Davis & Kenneth Drake, United States: Protecting the Private Equity Investment Without 
Killing the Golden Goose, INTL. FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1, 2003. 
153 See Hi-Tech Charter, supra note 92, at 8-12  8-13.  For instance, if a VC investor purchased for $1 a 
share of preferred stock having a 3X senior liquidation preference, it would be entitled to $3rather 
than $1upon an acquisition of the company prior to any proceeds being paid on other shares of 
company capital stock. 
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of a start-up company, but no more.  In order for a holder to receive more 
than its stated liquidation preference, the holder must convert its preferred 
stock into common stock.  In contrast, participating convertible preferred 
stock permits a preferred stockholder to receive the stated liquidation 
preference and, thereafter, share (or participate) in the proceeds payable 
on shares of the companys common stock without any need for the holder 
to convert into common stock.  These preferential terms allowed VC 
investors the opportunity to realize significant returns on their investment 
should a start-up company be acquired even at the prevailing acquisition 
values.  The downside was that after payment of the preferred stock 
liquidation preferences, there was often little left to split among the 
participating preferred stock, the junior-ranking preferred stock and the 
common stock.154   
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VC investors also demanded stronger forms of antidilution protection.  
In particular, VC investors increasingly purchased securities with full-
ratchet antidilution protection rather than the historic industry-standard 
weighted-average antidilution protection.155  Full-ratchet antidilution 
protection effectively re-prices the protected preferred stock to the price 
of any future, lower-priced issuance.156  Indeed, under most formulations, 
the issuance of even a single share of lower-priced stock requires re-pricing 
all protected preferred stock to the lower price.  The result is in stark 
                                                
154  Not surprisingly, the use of preferred stock with generous liquidation preferences has been one of the 
primary sources of potential litigation in recent years among founders and VC investors.  As one 
commentator notes, the pain of the early investors in seeing later-stage investors benefit from the 
liquidation event disproportionately [on account of liquidation preferences] may equate to litigation 
against the [later-stage] fund and its managers.  Pamela Mason, Are we Covered?, VENTURE CAP. J., 
Mar. 1, 2005. 
155 See supra Figure 3; see also Carolina Brauschweig, No More Easy Street:  VCs Tighten the Purse 
Strings, VENTURE CAP. J., May 1, 2001.  
156 Technically, the issuance of lower-priced stock requires the conversion price of the protected 
preferred stock to be reduced to the price of the new issuance.  
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contrast to weighted-average formulas which re-price protected preferred 
stock based on the price and quantity of the new issuance.  As a result, a 
future down-round financing could create significant conflicts between VC 
investors holding shares of preferred stock with full-ratchet antidilution 
protection and those stockholders who held unprotected securities or 
securities having more mild forms of antidilution protection.  Imagine, for 
example, that LaterFund had received full-ratchet antidilution protection in 
the Series B financing of NewCo.  Assuming NewCo completed a 
$5,000,000 Series C financing at a $15,000,000 valuation, the Series B full-
ratchet antidilution protection would have resulted in LaterFund becoming 
the largest shareholder of NewCoeven with full pro-rata participation by 
both LaterFund and EarlyFund.  Specifically, LaterFunds equity stake 
would have increased from 16.7% to 37.5%, while EarlyFunds equity stake 
would have increased from 33.3% to only 35.7%. 
Lastly, many down-round financings involved a related recapitalization, 
often with significant adverse changes to the terms of existing preferred 
stock.  In many cases, a recapitalization of a companys existing preferred 
stock was necessary due to the triggering of preferred stock antidilution 
protection.  Companies that raised capital at high valuations during the late 
1990s found that raising capital at lower valuations during the ensuing 
economic recession might trigger an antidilution death spiral, particularly 
where a company had issued stock with ratchet antidilution protection.157  In 
these instances, the antidilution adjustments required such significant 
adjustments to the common stock conversion rates of the protected preferred 
stock that it was mathematically impossible to honor the antidilution 
protection at particular valuations.158   The only possibility for completing a 
financing at the specified valuation was to restructure the preferred stock.   
At the same time, VC investors recognized the adverse effect that a 
down-round financing could have on the financial incentives of company 
managers.  The significant dilution resulting from the drop in a companys 
valuationespecially when combined with investors antidilution 
protectionoften left common stockholders with no meaningful equity 
stake.159  The large liquidation preferences demanded by VC investors 
compounded the problem.  Most managers were aware that the most likely 
liquidity event during this period was through an acquisition.  But given the 
depressed acquisition valuations of start-up companies, investors aggregate 
liquidation preferences threatened to absorb most, if not all, of the probable 
acquisition proceeds.160  Thus, to make a company fundable, a companys 
existing VC investors often had to agree to a reduction of existing 
liquidation preferences or even the conversion of some or all of their 
                                                
157 Timothy Harris, The Antidilution Death Spiral, 5 J. PRIVATE EQUITY. 34 (2002). 
158 For an analysis for how these adjustments could result in such situations, see generally Bartlett, supra 
note 134, at 31-34 
159 See id. 
160 See Ravi Chiruvolu, It May Be Time To Hit the Reset Button On Liquidation Preferences, VENTURE 
CAP. J., July 1, 2002. 
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preferred stock into common stock.161  In many cases, existing VC investors 
consented to these adverse changes in hopes of recouping their investment 
in the company through the rights of the newly issued securities.  For many 
investors, however, the adverse changes were forced upon them due to 
insufficient veto rights or the existence of a pay-to-play provision.162   
Arguably, to the extent all existing VC investors participated in these 
financings, many conflicts might be diminished given that all investors 
would receive the new preferential rights.  A principal challenge for a 
down-round financing, however, was that not all VC investors couldor 
wouldparticipate in it.  For many early backers of a company, the 
capital/time investment constraint prevented them from investing more in 
the company.163  In other cases, VC investors simply appear to have been 
reluctant to throw good money after bad.   As one venture capitalist 
remarked in 2002, [o]ur position is that, if financing will not last the 
company one year, and if the company is not profitable after that, we will 
not invest.  You have to make tough decisions in this environment, and 
sometimes you just have to walk.164 
Not surprisingly, the rise of down-round financings quickly exposed the 
latent inter-investor conflicts arising from the combination of staged 
financing and investment syndication.  Negotiations between a companys 
participating and non-participating investors over how to split the 
equity165 were difficult owing to the presence of investors reciprocal veto 
rights.  Commenting on the rise of down-round financings, the Venture 
Capital Journal began a series of stories detailing the challenges of these 
financings, noting new investors structuring protective measures and lower 
valuations into the term sheet are pushing existing venture backers into 
defensive positions, forcing some to dig in their heels.166  In some cases, 
the prevalence of reciprocal veto rights could give rise to strategic behavior 
among investors.  A story of one such negotiation recounted by a prominent 
VC attorney illustrates the holdup potential of investors veto rights: 
The case I am citing involved a shareholder exercising veto rights 
over a salvage round of financing, one the company needed in order 
to survive.  Through negative covenants in that shareholders 
particular series of preferred stock, the shareholder in question was 
demanding special consideration, in this case cash, to surrender the 
veto right  even though the shareholder had no plans to participate 
(although invited) in the salvage round.167  
                                                
161 Curtis Mo, Recent Trends in Venture Capital Financing Terms, in 35TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON 
SECURITIES REGULATION 193, 221-22 (Practicing Law Inst. Course Handbook Series No. 1396, 2003). 
162 See Joan Lesser & Carrie Johnson, Financing Troubled Companies: Highly Dilutive (Down Round) 
Financings, COMP. INT. LAW. (January  2003). 
163 See supra notes 101-103. 
164 John Ince, Where Is the Money, UPSIDE, May 20, 2002 (quoting general partner of SI Ventures). 
165 Fellers, supra note 80. 
166 Brauschweig, supra note 155. 
167 Bartlett, supra note 134, at 34. 
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That participating and non-participating investors alike often had 
representatives on a companys board of directors further complicated 
matters.  The conflict of interest among investors concerning a down-round 
financing raised difficult questions regarding the boards fiduciary duties 
and the fairness of approving a down round financing.  Directors 
representing VC investors who would be participating in the financing had a 
financial interest in the transaction,168 requiring careful procedural 
precautions in order to discharge the directors duty of loyalty.169  Lawyers 
representing companies undergoing a down-round financing were quick to 
qualify once standard legal opinions concerning the enforceability of the 
transaction documents and to exclude entirely any opinions regarding the 
boards compliance with its fiduciary duties.170  A boards approval of a 
companys acquisition during this time likewise required the ability to 
navigate among conflicting investor interests.  As one attorney notes, in the 
event of a sale, directors will need to examine not only the distribution of 
acquisition proceeds between preferred stockholders and common 
stockholders, but also how  the conflict of interest [is] affected if the 
preferred stockholders themselves have differing economic interestse.g., 
if one venture fund is senior in its liquidation preferences to the others, such 
that the most senior venture fund receives the vast majority of the 
liquidation distributions.171     
In sum, the down-round financings of 2001-2003 exposed not only the 
prevalence of inter-investor conflicts of interest but also the imperfections 
of the prevailing methods of containing them.  Not surprisingly, warnings 
quickly became commonplace in the VC industry that the potential for 
liability [for VC investors] in downrounds is very real and  the risks do 
not go away once the financing is completed.172   
B.  The Realization of Conflict: 
Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague 
In the summer of 2002, the potential intensity of inter-investor conflict 
became vividly public in Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague.173  
As noted earlier, the case arose from an attempt by Benchmark Capital to 
                                                
168 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1998). 
169 See, e.g., Lesser & Johnson, supra note 162 (If the company later becomes successful, these deemed 
conflicts of interest may prompt claims by existing shareholders who suffer substantial dilution in the 
down round  that the interested directors breached their fiduciary duties to the companys 
shareholders by approving the transaction.); Stephan Mallenbaum & Sheila Saegh, Pay-to-Play 
Structure Increases Investors' Leverage in Business, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 3, 2001). 
170 See Kurt Berney, Dilutive Venture Capital Financings, in PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL 
INVESTING: LEGAL, FINANCIAL & STRATEGIC TECHNIQUES FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 163, 193-194 
(Practicing Law Inst. Course Handbook Series No. 1276, 2001). 
171 Matthew Quilter & Austin Choi, Duties of Directors: Venture Capitalist Board Representatives and 
Conflicts of Interest, in VENTURE CAPITAL: GETTING FINANCING IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 889, 
905 (Practicing Law Inst. Course Handbook Series No. 1267, 2001). 
172 Egan & Selinger, supra note 144. 
173 2002 WL 31057462 (Del. Ch., July 15, 2002), affd, 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003). 
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enjoin one of its start-up companies, Juniper Financial Corp., and a co-
investor in the company, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
(CIBC), from consummating a down-round financing of Juniper.  
Although the case has received some scholarly attention,174 no one has yet 
examined why syndicated VC investment in Juniper should have resulted in 
such disastrous consequences.  As the analysis below demonstrates, the case 
was fundamentally the result of Benchmark and CIBC implementing the 
strategies outlined in Part II in an economic environment that accentuated 
the potential inter-investor conflict these strategies can create.  At the same 
time, Benchmark lacked the veto power it believed it had secured to keep 
this conflict in check.  
In many ways, the history of Benchmarks investment in Juniper was 
representative of the VC investment strategies described in Part II(A).  As 
an early-stage investor, Benchmark made its initial $20 million investment 
in Juniper shortly after Junipers incorporation in January 2000 as an on-line 
bank.175  Typical of VC investment, Benchmark acquired shares of Series A 
Preferred Stock and received a number of control and monitoring rights, 
most notably representation on the companys board of directors as well as 
several stockholder veto rights.176  Benchmark also engaged in staged 
financing and syndication.  When Juniper next needed capital in September 
2000, Benchmark helped arrange a $95.5 million Series B financing to be 
led by another investor, J&W Seligman, and further agreed to invest $5 
million in it.  When Juniper required additional capital the following year, 
Benchmark again assisted the company by approving a $145 million Series 
C financing.  In contrast to the Series B financing, however, Juniper raised 
the full $145 million without participation by Benchmark, selling all shares 
of Series C Preferred Stock to CIBC.177   
Like Benchmark, CIBC also engaged in the VC investment strategies 
outlined in Part II(A).  First, as the companys largest VC investor, CIBC 
demanded the right to select six of the eleven members of Junipers board of 
directors.  CIBC also obtained majority voting power of the company 
through its purchase of the Series C Preferred Stock, although exercise of 
this power would be subject to the Series A and Series B stockholder veto 
rights.  Benchmark and Seligman, no doubt aware of the potential inter-
investor conflicts that might arise with CIBC, had approved the Series C 
financing on the condition of retaining these reciprocal veto rights.  
Although CIBC appeared to accept this arrangement, it did demand an 
important concession from the existing stockholders.  Specifically, it 
obtained the right to waive these veto rights, provided the waiver did not 
                                                
174 See D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith and the Interpretation of Venture 
Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825 (2004).  In his article, Professor Smith focuses 
primarily on analyzing the doctrine of independent legal significance rather than the causes underlying 
Benchmarks suit.  
175 See 2002 WL 31057462 at *2. 
176 See id. at *2-3. 
177 See id. at *2. 
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diminish or alter the liquidation preference or other financial or economic 
rights of the Series A Preferred Stock or Series B Preferred Stock.178  In 
addition to CIBCs control rights, the terms of the Series C Preferred Stock 
contained a number of beneficial economic rights, such as a senior 
liquidation preference and full ratchet antidilution protection.179  As 
described in Part IV(A), these preferential rights might harm the interests of 
Benchmark and Seligman, but they appear to have consented to the terms on 
the assumption that the Series C financing would be the companys final 
round of equity financing.180 
Unfortunately for Benchmark and Seligman, this proved to be a 
disastrous assumption.  Notwithstanding the size of the Series C financing, 
Juniper notified its investors in early 2002 that even more capital would be 
required to sustain the company.181  The significant capital needs of Juniper 
stemmed largely from federal banking regulations that required the 
company to maintain a well-capitalized status.  Failure to do so could 
result in the company becoming subject to a number of regulatory remedies, 
such as the loss of the right to issue Visa cards, which represented the 
companys primary line of business.182  With the assistance of an investment 
banking firm, Juniper sought financing from a number of outside VC firms 
as well as from its existing investors.  Ultimately, however, these efforts 
were unsuccessful except with respect to CIBC which proposed a $50 
million Series D financing.   
The proposed financing from CIBC was a down-round financing that 
would result in a number of adverse consequences to the Series A and 
Series B Preferred Stock.  First, the Series D Preferred Stock would be 
issued at a discounted price, triggering CIBCs ratchet antidilution 
protection.183  As a result, CIBC would hold more than 90% of Junipers 
voting power following the financing while the collective equity interests of 
the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock would drop from 29% to 7%.184  
Second, the Series D Preferred Stock would rank senior to the Series A and 
Series B Preferred Stock in terms of liquidation rights, redemption rights 
and dividend rights.  Given that the Series C Preferred Stock was also senior 
to the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock, Benchmark and Seligman 
would receive nothing in an acquisition of the company unless the 
consideration was sufficient to satisfy $195 million of Series C and Series D 
liquidation preferences.  In addition, the proposal also required the 
recapitalization of the companys Series A and Series B Preferred Stock to 
                                                
178 Id. at *3. 
179 The Series A and Series B Preferred Stock were entitled to more mild weighted-average 
antidilution protection.  See Juniper Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, at 24.  
180 See 2002 WL 31057462 at *3. 
181 See id. at *4. 
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reduce the aggregate liquidation preference on these shares from $115 
million to $15 million.185    
Not surprisingly, Benchmark objected to the proposal.  Arguing that 
Junipers financial problems could be solved through further cost 
reductions, Benchmark sought to prevent the financing by exercising its 
stockholder veto rights.  Many of the terms of the proposed financing 
appeared to fall within the scope of Benchmarks retained veto rights.  Both 
the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock were entitled to a class vote on 
corporate actions that would [m]aterially adversely change the rights, 
preferences and privileges of the relevant series of preferred stock.186   In 
addition, the Series A and Series B stockholders also held a class veto over 
the authorization or issuance of any other equity security  senior to or on 
a parity with the Series A Preferred Stock or Series B Preferred Stock as to 
dividend rights or redemption rights, voting rights or liquidation 
preferences.187  
Recognizing Benchmarks veto rights, CIBC and Juniper sought to 
avoid a Benchmark vote by completing the authorization of the financing 
and the preferred stock recapitalization through a merger of Juniper with a 
wholly-owned subsidiary.  Under section 251 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, a merger could be used to modify Junipers charter 
documents,188 and CIBC and Juniper contended that the Series A and Series 
B veto rights applied only to modifications of the preferred stock through a 
direct amendment of the companys charter.  Although the Series A and 
Series B Preferred Stock held a class veto right over a merger of Juniper, a 
merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary was specifically excluded from the 
veto right.  Once the merger was completed, Juniper would then issue the 
newly-authorized Series D Preferred Stock to CIBC. 
Benchmark filed suit to enjoin the merger and the subsequent issuance 
of the Series D Preferred Stock.  Its case rested on two distinct arguments.  
First, Benchmark argued that the merger would violate the Series A and 
Series B veto rights because the merger was a corporate action that 
materially adversely change[d] the rights, preferences and privileges of 
the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock.189  Second, both the mergerby 
authorizing the Series D Preferred Stockand the companys execution of 
a stock purchase agreement obligating itself to issue the Series D Preferred 
Stock violated Benchmarks veto rights over the authorization or issuance 
of a senior security.190  Benchmark acknowledged that CIBC had the 
authority to waive these veto rights; however, it argued that pursuant to its 
agreement with CIBC, a waiver was prohibited if it would diminish or alter 
the liquidation preference or other financial or economic rights of the 
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188 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 251(b) (2002). 
189 Id. at *7. 
190 See id. at *9. 
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Series A or Series B Preferred Stock.191  Because the merger and the 
issuance of the senior Series D Preferred Stock diminished the economic 
rights of the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock, the wavier could not 
apply. 
These arguments were rejected in an opinion written by Vice Chancellor 
Noble.  With respect to Benchmarks first argument, Vice Chancellor Noble 
noted that Benchmarks challenge was confronted by a long line of 
Delaware cases holding that protective provisions drafted to provide a 
class of preferred stock with a class vote before those shares rights, 
preferences and privileges may be altered or modified do not fulfill their 
apparent purpose of assuring a class vote if adverse consequences flow from 
a merger and the protective provisions do not expressly afford protection 
against a merger.192  Had Benchmark intended the veto rights to cover 
material adverse changes accomplished through a merger, Benchmark 
should have added this restriction.  As a consequence, the court concluded, 
to the extent that the merger adversely affects the rights, preferences and 
privileges of either the Series A Preferred or Series B Preferred Stock, those 
consequences are the product of a merger, a corporate event which the 
drafters of the protective provision could have addressed, but did not.193  
The recapitalization of the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock could 
therefore proceed without a class vote. 
The court similarly rejected Benchmarks challenge to the authorization 
and issuance of the Series D Preferred Stock.  The court acknowledged that 
the class veto right over authorization of senior securities did not implicate 
the distinction between direct modification to preferred stock accomplished 
through charter amendment and indirect modifications effected through 
merger; however, it concluded that the use of a merger to authorize the 
Series D Preferred Stock was nonetheless fatal to Benchmarks challenge.  
The court cited established concerns with reading general language 
concerning preferred stock voting rights to require a class vote on a merger 
and its integral and accompanying modifications to the corporate charter 
and the corporations capital structure where none was intended.194  Rather, 
the court concluded that [t]o protect against the potential negative effects 
of a merger, those who draft protective provisions have been instructed to 
make clear that those protective provisions specifically and directly limit the 
mischief that can otherwise be accomplished through a merger under 8 Del. 
C. § 251.195   
The courts concern with creating inadvertent veto rights also led it to 
reject Benchmarks argument that CIBC had no authority to waive its right 
to veto the issuance of the Series D Preferred Stock.  Because the issuance 
was not accomplished through the merger, Benchmarks veto right over 
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issuances of senior securities would apply unless CIBC could waive it.  The 
court, however, accepted CIBCs argument that the simple issuance of a 
senior security by Juniper did not diminish the financial or economic 
rights of the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock, thereby entitling CIBC 
to waive the veto right.  Although the court admitted that the scope of the 
wavier was ambiguous, it reasoned that where (at least) an ambiguity 
exists, our law requires that it be resolved against creating the 
preference.196  CIBC and Juniper could therefore complete the proposed 
Series D financing notwithstanding its adverse economic effect on 
Benchmark and Seligman. 
 
V.  RECONSIDERING BENCHMARK, PREFERRED STOCK AND MODERN 
CORPORATE SCHOLARSHIP   
By demonstrating the potential intensity of inter-investor conflict, the 
Benchmark lawsuit quickly became one of the most well-known legal 
disputes concerning the VC industry.  For journalists seeking to examine the 
implications of the dot-com meltdown, the case represented a symbolic 
shift in the operations of the VC market.  The Wall Street Journal 
interpreted the case as a concrete example of the tensions  appearing in 
the once-clubby world of venture capital as investors fight to wring value 
from troubled investments made during the Internet bubble.197  For VC 
investors and their lawyers, the case represented an important cautionary 
tale of a VC firm that failed to protect itself against the risk of inter-investor 
conflict.  For them, the lesson to be learned from Benchmark was clear:  VC 
investors should draft better protective provisions.198 
Outside the context of VC investment, however, the Benchmark case has 
received only scant attention.  This is unfortunate, for there are broader 
lessons to be drawn from the case.  First, the case clearly demonstrates the 
manner in which VC investors seek to utilize preferred stock to manage 
contractually inter-investor conflicts.  As such, it suggests the need for a 
reconsideration of the Benchmark courts refusal to apply ordinary contract 
principles in interpreting the terms of Benchmarks preferred stock rights.  
Second, the conflict between Benchmark and CIBC provides a concrete 
illustration of the dynamic agency costs confronted by VC investors.  By 
seeking to control investor-manager agency risk, Benchmark and CIBC 
created a dimension of inter-investor agency risk that ultimately created the 
conflict underlying the lawsuit.  In so doing, Benchmark emphasizes the 
need to advance a theory of the firm capable of accounting for the dynamic 
development of multi-dimensional agency problems within a firm. 
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A.  The Contractual Nature of Preferred Stock Rights 
Although journalistic accounts of Benchmark focused on the rise of 
inter-investor tensions following the dot-com meltdown, the existence of 
inter-investor conflict was hardly a new development.  As discussed in Part 
III, the potential for inter-investor conflict is an endemic feature of VC 
investment owing to staged investment and investment syndication.  Nor 
was it particularly novel that a controlling shareholder in a private 
corporation should engage in allegedly rent-seeking behavior at the expense 
of Benchmark, a non-controlling shareholder.  The American history of the 
private corporation is replete with stories of minority shareholder 
oppression.199   
Indeed, in this light perhaps the most intriguing question about 
Benchmark isnt why did the lawsuit occur? but why arent there more 
lawsuits like it?  This is particularly true of the period following 2001 
when inter-investor tensions were especially pronounced.  Yet public 
disputeslet alone lawsuitsamong VC investors have remained 
exceedingly rare.  Although several inter-investor lawsuits have arisen since 
2002, the number of lawsuits is surprisingly small relative to the number of 
down-round financings.200  Moreover, the small number of lawsuits is in 
marked contrast to the dire warnings during the 2001-2003 economic 
downturn concerning the potential legal liability for VC investors 
participating in down-round financings.201  What explains the dearth of 
inter-investor disputes?   
One potential answer to this question is that VC investing is 
fundamentally a species of relational contracting.  As such, VC investors 
presumably rely on reputational sanctions to deter both rent-seeking actions 
by controlling investors as well as lawsuits by non-controlling investors.  It 
is commonly argued that a VC firms concern about preserving its 
reputation for fair dealing among managers of start-up companies constrains 
its willingness to act opportunistically towards management.202  It might 
therefore be supposed that a similar dynamic constrains one VC investor 
from acting opportunistically towards another investor.203  Under this 
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theory, a VC investor who acts aggressively towards another investor may 
develop a tarnished reputation among fellow investors as untrustworthy and 
opportunistic.  As a consequence, the investor might receive fewer 
invitations to participate in promising start-up companies, which will 
ultimately harm the firms financial performance.  Thus, a VC investors 
desire for deal flow may create an incentive for developing a reputation 
for fair-dealing and non-litigiousness within the VC community. 
While there is evidence that reputational concerns do encourage 
cooperative behavior among VC investors,204 they cannot entirely explain 
the resilience of this cooperation.  The significant growth of the VC industry 
over the past decade makes it unlikely that the VC community resembles 
those communities where norm-based reputational sanctions have come to 
displace legal sanctions.205  At the same time, the growth of the industry 
during the 1990s followed by the ensuing economic downturn accentuated 
the tension between short-term financial gain and long-term deal-flow.  
With the growth of the industry, VC firms have raised larger investment 
funds, causing the size of individual investments to increase significantly.206  
With greater amounts of capital at stake in each start-up company, the 
incentive to protect these investments in the face of the significant inter-
investor conflicts outlined in Parts III and IV undoubtedly strained any 
reputational incentives promoting cooperation.207  This appears to have been 
precisely the case in Benchmarknot only did CIBC negotiate provisions 
that accentuated the conflict with Benchmark, but each of CIBC and 
Benchmark invested considerable sums in Juniper. 
In these situations, an investorno longer able to rely on reputational 
incentives to constrain rent-seeking behaviormust instead rely on 
                                                
204 Anectoal evidence suggests that venture capitalists are well aware of the importance of maintaining a 
positive reputation among fellow VC investors.  For instance, one nineteen-year veteran venture 
capitalist cautions younger venture capitalists to [t]reat everyone with fairness and dignity.  That goes 
for founders, management, co-investors and service providers.  Failure to treat people with respect will 
damage your reputation and turn off your deal flow. Fred Dotzler, Top 10 Tips for new VCs from an 
Old Hand, VENTURE CAP. J., October 1, 2003.  
205 In general, social norms appear to work best as a non-legal sanction within a close-knit community, 
defined as a network in which power is broadly distributed and information pertinent to informal control 
circulates easily among network members.  See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 177 (1991).  The VC industry, in contrast, has undergone considerable 
expansion in recent years.  The membership of the NVCA alone has grown from 87 firms in 1980 to 
over 900 firms in 2003 with over 9,000 investment principals.  See NVCA YEARBOOK at 18-19.  Indeed, 
veteran venture capitalists occasionally lament the changing world of venture capital [f]rom a gang of 
investors and entrepreneurs who were joined at the hip  into an industry that requires nametags.  
Michael Copeland, Protect Thyself, VENTURE CAP. J., December 1, 2002. 
206 For instance, in each of the primary VC investment sectors, the average size of a first-round equity 
financing increased from approximately $1 million in 1980 to over $5.2 million in 2003 in inflation-
adjusted dollars.  See NVCA Yearbook supra note 83, at 40. 
207 Industry insiders often explain the handful of inter-investor lawsuits as reflecting a new attitude 
among VC investors regarding the need to salvage large sunk investments.  As one prominent attorney 
summarized in 2003: In the past, venture capitalists made a point of getting along with others because 
they might need that person in a future situation.  But that paradigm is busted.  VCs have train wrecks 
for performance.  Janet Whitman, Squeezed Early Investors Are Fit to Sue, WALL ST. J., March 5, 2003 
(quoting Joseph Bartlett).  
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negotiated contract provisions to minimize the risks posed by inter-investor 
conflicts.  Of particular importance in this regard are the veto rightsor 
quasi-veto rights (such as liquidation preferences and anti-dilution rights)
described in Part III.  These rights protect a VC investor against corporate 
actions adverse to its particular economic interests.  Indeed, a tremendous 
amount of practitioner commentary following Benchmark focused on 
advising VC firms on how to avoid loopholes in their protective provisions, 
underscoring the importance of these veto rights within the VC industry.208   
That these veto rights are drafted as preferred stock rights should in no 
way diminish their fundamentally contractual nature as agreements among a 
companys VC investors.  The one document a companys VC investors are 
likely to read carefullythe non-binding term sheetoften lumps the 
allocation of investor veto rights under a general heading entitled 
Protective Provisions.209  In turning the term sheet into VC contracts, 
most of these veto rights are set forth in the companys charter as preferred 
stock rights, although many may also appear in other, more explicitly 
contractual documents, such as the Investors Rights Agreement or the 
Voting Agreement.210  The decision ordinarily turns on issues of 
practicality, such as whether the veto right should be controlled by vote of a 
particular VC investors board designee or by a particular group of preferred 
stockholders.211     
In virtually all cases, investors veto-rights are allocated not to 
individually named VC investors but to particular series of preferred 
stock.212  The use of reciprocal veto rights to control inter-investor conflict 
would pose an especially acute risk of investor hold-ups were each VC 
investor to receive separate veto-rights.  Allocating rights based on 
preferred stock ownership diminishes this risk.  As discussed in Part III, 
inter-investor conflicts arise from the fact that a companys VC investors 
                                                
208 See, e.g., Orrick Publications: Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, available at 
www.Orrick.com; LeClaire, supra note 68. 
209 See, e.g., NVCA, Model Term Sheet, at 6, available at http://www.nvca.org/model_documents/ 
model_docs.html. 
210 See Thomas Klaus Gump, Down Round Financings in 1 VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING 
NEGOTIATION 10A-1, 10A-11 (Michael J. Halloran et al. eds, 3d ed. Supp. 2003) (noting that investor 
veto rights may be found in a stockholders agreement between the company and all or part of its 
shareholders or, as is typically preferred by investors, in the publicly filed certificate or articles of 
incorporation of the issuer). 
211 For instance, the NVCA Model Investors Rights Agreement provides for a number of Matters 
Requiring Investor Director Approval that largely track the protective provisions specified in the Model 
Term Sheet.  See NVCA, Model Investors Rights Agreement, at 29-30, available at 
http://www.nvca.org/model_documents/ model_docs.html. A footnote comment emphasizes that the 
provision is often included as a means of negotiation expediency: In many cases, the investors wont go 
forward without this provision.  In other cases, the topics of concern would otherwise be added to the 
Certificate of Incorporation and require a shareholder vote.  The company might find the director 
approval approach more attractive as a compromise. Id. 
212 See NVCA Model Charter, at 17-18 (providing for Series A  Preferred Stock Protective 
Provisions); Hi-Tech Charter, at 8-558-57 (providing for protective provisions that may be approved 
by vote of two-thirds of all shares of Preferred Stock and for protective provisions that may only be 
approved by two-thirds vote of each series of Preferred Stock). 
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purchase securities issued at different times and different prices.  By 
creating a new series of preferred stock at each issuance, a company and its 
VC investors create a means by which to group investors whose economic 
interests should generally be aligned.  Allocating investor rights by series of 
preferred stock therefore allows each group of investors having similar 
economic interests to protect their collective interests while diminishing the 
risk that any one investor can engage in rent-seeking behavior through 
opportunistically exercising a veto right.213   
In short, VC investors have few legal disputes because, when 
reputational incentives for cooperation fail, they have negotiated an 
elaborate set of contracts to address the risk of inter-investor conflict.  
Considered in this light, a primary failure of the Benchmark opinionand 
of Delaware corporate jurisprudence in generalis the refusal to apply 
ordinary contract principles in interpreting the terms of preferred stock 
rights.  To be sure, Delaware courts do recognize the contractual nature of 
the rights set forth in a companys certificate of incorporation.  As the 
Benchmark court noted,  
[c]ertificates of incorporation define contractual relationships not 
only among the corporation and its stockholders but also among the 
stockholders.  Thus, [Junipers] Certificate defines, as a matter of 
contract, both the relationship between Benchmark and Juniper and 
the relative relationship between Benchmark, as a holder of junior 
preferred stock, and CIBC, as the holder of senior preferred stock.  
For these reasons, courts look to general principles of contract 
construction in construing certificates of incorporation.214 
In ascertaining the scope of preferred stock rights, however, the court 
cited a further Delaware principle concerning preferred stock.  According to 
this principle, a courts function in interpreting the rights of preferred 
stockholders  
is essentially one of contract interpretation against the background 
of Delaware precedent.  These precedential parameters are simply 
stated:  Any rights, preferences and limitations of preferred stock 
that distinguish that stock from common stock must be expressly 
and clearly stated, as provided by statute.  Therefore, these rights, 
preferences and liquidations will not be presumed or implied.215   
                                                
213 Of course, the risk for opportunistic rent-seeking is not eliminated by the creation of preferred stock 
voting blocks.  On the contrary, the block itself may engage in rent-seeking activities.  In most 
circumstances, however, the existence of reciprocal veto rights should create a mutual-hostage 
situation that forces VC investors to negotiate cooperatively to resolve inter-investor disputes.  See 
Robert P. Bartlett, III, Conflict and Cooperation in Venture Capital Contracting (manuscript on file with 
the author); cf. Oliver Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 
AM. ECON. REV. 519, 540 (1983) (discussing incentives for cooperative dispute resolution in ventures 
where a mutual hostage situation exists). 
214 2002 WL 31057462 at *6.  
215 Id. (quoting Elliot Associates, L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.25 843, 852-53 (Del. 1998)). 
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Although these precedential parameters would seem to apply only to the 
rights, preferences and limitations of preferred stock that distinguish that 
stock from common stock, Judge Noble had little difficult summarily 
concluding that [t]hese principles also apply in construing the relative 
rights of holders of different series of preferred stock.216 
Armed with this principle, Judge Noble thus disposed of Benchmarks 
workmanlike attempt to interpret its preferred stock using ordinary contract 
principles.  As noted above, Benchmark focused on the broad wording of its 
veto power to conclude that it held a veto right over Junipers proposed 
mergera corporate action that would seem to materially adversely 
change the rights, preferences and privileges of the Series A and Series B 
Preferred Stock.217  Although this straight-forward analysis might satisfy a 
Delaware court interpreting an ordinary contract,218 the problem for 
Benchmark was the need to interpret the veto against the background of 
Delaware precedent.  This precedent includes Warner Communications, 
Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,219 which concluded that a veto right over 
adverse modifications to preferred stock rights does not apply if the adverse 
modifications result from a merger and the veto right does not expressly 
afford protection against a merger. 
Yet while Warner may have been fatal to Benchmarks attempt to veto 
the merger of Juniper, Warner did not dictate the outcome of Benchmarks 
other contract arguments concerning its right to veto the authorization and 
issuance of the Series D Preferred Stock.  With regard to the authorization 
of the Series D Preferred Stock, Junipers charter gave Benchmark the right 
to veto its authorization regardless of whether it was created by Junipers 
merger or otherwise.  Judge Noble, however, refused to read this veto right 
generally based on established Delaware precedent that protective rights 
must  be clearly expressed and will not be presumed.220  With regard to 
Benchmarks attempt to veto the issuance of the Series D Preferred Stock, 
Judge Noble likewise turned to this interpretive principle to address the 
argument.  As noted earlier, the primary issue was whether the issuance 
would diminish or alter the financial and economic rights of the Series A 
and Series B Preferred Stock.  Judge Noble conceded that an ambiguity 
existed in the meaning of this language and that it could easily be given the 
                                                
216 Id. 
217 See supra TAN 189-191. 
218 In general, Delaware courts interpret ordinary contracts using the plain meaning rule.  See Watkins 
v. Beatrice Companies, Inc., 50 A.2d 1016, 1021 (1989).  Under Delawares version of this rule, 
[c]ontracts must be construed as a whole, to give effect to the intentions of the parties.  Northwestern 
National Insurance Co. v. Esmark, Inc., 672 A.2d 41, 43 (1996).  To discern the parties intent, courts 
look first to the express language of the contract: [w]here the contract language is clear and 
unambiguous, the parties intent is ascertained by giving the language its ordinary and usual meaning. 
Id.  Delaware courts look to extrinsic evidence to discern contractual intent only if there is an ambiguity 
in the contract. Id. 
219 583 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989), affd, 567 A.2d 419 (Del. 1989). 
220 2002 WL 31057462 at *10. 
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broad interpretation suggested by Benchmark.221  He ultimately concluded, 
however, that [t]o adopt [Benchmarks] position would amount to 
presuming a preferential voting right.  In the present case, however, where 
(at least) an ambiguity exists, our law requires that it be resolved against 
creating the preference.222      
One might expect that given the importance of this preferred stock 
presumption in Benchmark, it would have a precedential pedigree of 
unquestionable authority.  Even a cursory analysis of its historical roots, 
however, reveals the presumption to be primarily a judicial enshrinement of 
specious dicta contained in a 1930 Delaware Chancery Court decision, 
Pennington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Co.223  In Pennington, the 
receiver of a liquidated corporation requested the Delaware Chancery Court 
to determine the proper allocation of the corporations remaining assets 
between its common and preferred stockholders.  The corporations charter 
provided that in the event of its liquidation, the preferred holders were to 
receive before the common holders the par value [of such preferred stock], 
and all unpaid dividends accrued thereon.224  At issue was whether the 
liquidated corporation could pay preferred stockholders their unpaid 
accrued dividends that were specified in the charter when it had never 
turned a profit and no capital surplus existed.  The court recognized that the 
charter essentially represented a contractual agreement between the 
preferred stockholders and common stockholders over the distribution of 
liquidation proceeds and proceeded to consider the question as solely one 
of contract between the common owners of a fund.225  In what can only be 
described as a tortured interpretation of the charter, the court concluded that 
the phrase unpaid dividends accrued thereon meant only those dividends 
that would have been payable out of net profits or surplus while the 
company was a going concern but went unpaid for some reason.226 
Not content with this contractual interpretation, the court added in dicta, 
The general rule is that preferred stock enjoys only those 
preferences which are specifically defined and that as to all matters 
lying outside the field of defined preferences, preferred stock has 
no rights which are not shared equally with the common stock.  
Hence if dividends in arrear are not made a specific charge on the 
assets representing capital paid in, they cannot be paid out of such 
assets on liquidation.227 
In support of this proposition, the court cited a 1929 chancery court opinion, 
Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co.228  Only the loosest read of Gaskill, 
                                                
221 Id. at *13. 
222 Id. 
223 151 A. 228 (Del. Ch. 1928). 
224 Id. at 230. 
225 Id. at 232. 
226 Id. at 234. 
227 Id. 
228 146 A. 337 (Del. Ch. 1929). 
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however, could support this broad pronunciation.  Gaskill concerned the 
narrow issue of whether the rights of preferred stock could be set forth in a 
corporations bylaws as opposed to its charter.  The chancery court in 
Gaskill focused primarily on Section 13 of the Delaware corporate statute of 
1919 which provided that [e]very corporation shall have power to create 
two or more classes of stock, with such designations, preferences and voting 
power, or restrictions or qualifications thereof, as shall be stated and 
expressed in the Certificate of Incorporation.229  Given this language, the 
Gaskill court concluded that the preferred stock rights should have been set 
forth in the charter and not the bylaws.230   
Nothing in Gaskill suggests that, had these rights been expressed in the 
charter, it would have applied anything other than ordinary contract 
principles in interpreting them.231  Nonetheless, Pennington became the first 
of a long line of cases to place a broad judicial gloss on Gaskill.  By 1937, 
Gaskill was construed to require that preferred stock rights not only be 
expressed in the charter, but clearly expressed;232 and by 1943, Gaskill 
and its progeny required that preferred stock rights must be strictly 
construed.233   This doctrine of strict construction continued until 1998 
when the Delaware Supreme Court disapproved the continued use of the 
phrase.234  The court nonetheless continued to endorse the rule that preferred 
stock rights be clearly expressed and will not be presumed235an 
approach that, as seen in Benchmark, can operate as strict construction in 
everything but name.  
Analysis of the policy reasons for the development of this interpretive 
principle of preferred stock only further weakens its doctrinal validity.  
Pennington, like Gaskill, involved a dispute between common and preferred 
stockholders over the distribution of a liquidated companys assets.  
Understanding this historical context is critical, for this type of dispute was 
a common one in the early years of preferred stock and significantly colored 
courts analysis of preferred stock rights.  Gaskill, for instance, relied 
heavily on a line of New Jersey and English cases involving similar disputes 
between common and preferred stockholders over the distribution of a 
liquidated companys assets.  These cases held that with respect to capital 
[paid in] all outstanding stock, whatever its source, is entitled, in the 
absence of statute or of a contract provision to the contrary, to a ratable 
participation in the distribution of the capital to which all have 
contributed.236   
                                                
229 Id. at 338. 
230 See id. at 340-41. 
231 See id. at 339 (It is elementary that the rights of stockholders are contract rights.  The holder of 
preferred stock must therefore refer to the appropriate language of the corporate contract for the 
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232 Holland v. National Automotive Fibres, Inc., 194 A. 124 (Del. Ch. 1937). 
233 Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, 52 F. Supp. 763 (1943). 
234 Elliot Associates, L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.25 843, 852 (Del. 1998). 
235 Id. at 852 n 46. 
236 Gaskill, 146 A. at 338. 
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In essence, these cases articulated a default rule of equal sharing for 
preferred stock and common stock in liquidation scenarios.  It is against this 
backdrop that one must interpret subsequent statements by Delaware courts 
that all stock enjoys equal rights and privileges, and that claims for special 
preferences must be clearly provided by the charter contract.  Such was in 
effect the holding of Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co.237  To the extent 
courts use this language to support a general rule of narrow construction of 
preferred stock rights, they give Gaskill a life entirely separate from its 
original policy rationale of specifying how preferred stockholders could opt 
out of an equal-sharing default rule on corporate liquidations. 
Nor does the one policy consideration advanced by contemporary 
Delaware courts create a satisfactory rationale for a narrow construction of 
preferred stock rights.  As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in Elliot 
Associates, L.P. v. Avatex Corp.,238 the interpretive principle of requiring 
preferred stock rights to be clearly expressed continues a coherent and 
rational approach to corporate finance.239  Corporate drafters seeking to 
create preferred stock veto rights need look only to the language used in 
Avatex for an example of a sufficiently clear veto right covering adverse 
changes effected through a merger.240  Judge Noble likewise expressed 
reluctance to create uncertainty in a complex area where Avatex has set 
down a framework for consistency.241   Yet Avatex provides clarity in only 
one narrowly-defined context.  It says nothing about how preferred 
stockholders can draft with sufficient clarity the multitude of other rights 
they might seek.  Under the logic of Avatex, preferred stockholders must 
remain uncertain of the legal effect of these untested rights until a court 
has approved a particular expression as sufficiently clear.  In this regard, it 
can hardly be surprising that commentary within the VC industry following 
Benchmark expressed concern regarding the enforceability of other 
customary preferred stock terms.242  Indeed, the fact that the Delaware 
Supreme Court felt compelled to provide a path for future drafters at all is 
itself a testament to the systemic uncertainties created by the prevailing 
preferred stock interpretive principles.   
Thus, there are neither doctrinal nor policy reasons for treating the 
complex contractual arrangement negotiated by CIBC, Juniper and 
Benchmark as something other than contractual.  Using both preferred 
stock and standard contract provisions, CIBC and Benchmark did exactly 
what financial economists predict rational investors do when making an 
investment in a private corporation:  they sought to protect themselves 
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 MANAGING RISK ON A $25 MILLION BET 55 
through contract against potential agency risksboth those arising from 
conflicts with managers and those arising from conflicts with one another.  
To the extent investors use preferred stock to express these rights, the 
Delaware principle of narrow construction burdens these contractual rights 
in an unexpected and potentially costly way for investors.  Likewise for 
entrepreneurs, the enhanced investment risk faced by VC investors must 
inevitably lead to a higher cost of capital for firms seeking VC financing.243  
Admittedly, resorting to ordinary contract principles to interpret 
preferred stock rights will hardly eliminate the risk that contractual 
provisions may fail to have their intended effect.  Contracts are inherently 
incomplete and no contract can protect against all potential agency risks.244  
By forsaking the narrow construction doctrine, however, Delaware courts 
can ensure that the same gap-filling measures apply to all investor contract 
provisions regardless of the type of document that contains them.  In the 
context of venture capital, this result would permit VC investors to continue 
to use preferred stock as their security of choice without the attendant risks 
associated with the prevailing preferred stock interpretive principles. 
B.  Benchmark, Corporate Scholarship and the Theory of the Firm  
Whatever its shortcomings with respect to doctrinal analysis, Benchmark 
nevertheless provides a useful illustration of the central thesis of this 
Article.  The agency risks faced by Benchmark were multiple and complex.  
As with most VC investors, Benchmark sought to contain investor-manager 
agency risk with Junipers management through a variety of investment 
techniques, including staging its investments and syndicating it to other VC 
investors such as CIBC.  In so doing, however, Benchmark ultimately 
created a new dimension of inter-investor agency risk when CIBC itself 
sought to protect against potential agency problems with Junipers 
management.  Only by appreciating the dynamic formation of these agency 
risks is it possible to understand why Benchmark sought to preserve a 
separate veto right and why it ultimately sought to exercise it over the Series 
D financing.  Moreover, as this section shows, the analytical framework 
used in this Article provides insight not only into VC investment, but also 
into the general character of agency problems in a firm.  In this regard, the 
story of VC finance highlights the need to move beyond traditional theories 
of the firm and toward a theory that is robust to the dynamic character of 
multidimensional agency problems. 
First, this Articles emphasis on the presence of both investor-manager 
and inter-investor agency problems in VC investment suggests the need to 
                                                
243 See BARNEA, supra note 14, at 2 (noting correlation of non-systemic investment risk with a firms 
cost of capital). 
244 Indeed, the impossibility of drafting complete contracts is a primary reason why contracting parties 
can engage in opportunistic behavior towards one another.  See Benjamin Klein, The Hold-Up Problem, 
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reassess traditional analytical frameworks that emphasize a unitary 
perspective of agency risk within a firm.  As discussed previously, a 
significant amount of contemporary corporate scholarship concerns itself 
with examining the agency problems created by the separation between 
management and risk-bearing equity in public corporations.245  One need 
look no further than the significant debate concerning the proper internal 
governance institutions of firms to see the pervasiveness of this unitary, 
one-dimensional framework.  In their important work on team-production 
and corporate governance, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout note that a 
primary obstacle for their team-production theory is the widespread 
acceptance among corporate scholars of what they call the grand design 
principal agent paradigm.246  As they note, this paradigm has given rise to 
two recurring themes in legal scholarship:  
First, that the central economic problem addressed by corporation 
law is reducing agency costs by keeping directors and managers 
faithful to shareholders interests; and second, that the primary goal 
of the public corporation isor ought to bemaximizing 
shareholders wealth.247 
At first blush, Blair and Stouts alternative team-production model 
appears to provide a paradigm of the firm that moves beyond this unitary, 
one-dimensional framework.  In their view, a corporation consists of the 
collaborative efforts of multiple participants with potentially conflicting 
interests.  These participantsincluding shareholders, employees, and other 
stakeholders such as creditorsmake firm specific contributions to the 
corporation that are difficult to recover once committed.248   Because these 
contributions are also likely to be nonseparable from one another, a number 
of problems can arise as participants squabble over how to divide any 
economic surpluses generated by the team production.249  In general terms, 
the team members have created a series of agency relationships in which 
each participant is a principal and must rely on the team as its agent.250  
                                                
245 See supra TAN 30-33. 
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247 Id. at 248-49. 
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250 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the 
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To address the problem of mutual opportunism this creates, team members 
voluntarily cede control over the firm and their sunk-cost, firm-specific 
investments to an outside party that lacks any direct incentive to take 
advantage of team members.  In most public corporations, Blair and Stout 
argue that this role is filled by the board of directors which acts as a 
mediating hierarch of the firm to resolve team members conflicting 
interests.251 
Yet even as Blair and Stout assail the traditional grand design 
paradigm, they continue to rely on a fundamentally unitary perspective of 
agency riskor in their terms, team production problems.  Team 
members are presented as discrete constituents of the corporation with 
separate, well-defined interests.  For instance, Blair and Stout justify 
shareholder voting rights on the basis that shareholders have a 
homogenous interest in maximizing share price which is often in harmony 
with other stakeholders interests.252  Likewise, in their paradigm, the board 
mediates between the conflicting interests of distinct corporate 
constituencies such as bondholders, employees and shareholders.253  
This unitary approach towards each corporate constituency is certainly at 
odds with the experience of the VC industry where inter-shareholder 
conflict is a way of life.  Moreover, Benchmark demonstrated that VC 
investors will often seek to resolve these conflicts independently of the 
board through stockholder voting rights.  Blair and Stout concern 
themselves primarily with public corporations, but even in this context, the 
interests of corporate constituencies will often be heterogeneous.  This is 
particularly true for shareholders, who may have private interests that 
conflict with the goal of maximizing shareholder value generally or with the 
particular interests of certain shareholders.254  Just as in Benchmark, these 
private interests may induce influential shareholders to engage in rent-
seeking behavior that is beyond the domain of the board of directors 
authority to mediate.255  These inter-shareholder agency-problems remain 
unexplained by the team-production model, yet they may fundamentally 
affect the risk profile of corporate investment. 
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In contrast, corporate scholarship concerning close corporations has 
generally been better at grappling with the intra-stakeholder conflicts that 
can arise among shareholders.  As noted above, it is widely agreed that 
shareholders in closely held corporations face a high risk of loss from their 
fellow shareholders opportunism.256  Moreover, there is general consensus 
that the primary constraints on shareholder opportunismcontractual 
agreements, reputational constraints, fiduciary duties running from 
shareholder to shareholderare not entirely effective in eliminating this 
risk.257  The result is that the risk of inter-shareholder conflict increases the 
cost of capital for closely-held firms.258   
Yet here, too, the analytical framework underlying most studies of close 
corporations fails to account for the multiple dimensions of agency risk 
faced by investors in a private company.  In particular, investor-manager 
agency problems are commonly assumed to be non-existent or significantly 
reduced in closely-held corporations.259  The primary exception is, of 
course, in the context of VC investment where scholars have focused 
exclusively on these agency problems to the exclusion of agency problems 
among investors.  While this Article has shown the short-comings of the 
traditional VC model, the model nevertheless illustrates that investor-
manager agency problems may play a critical role in closely-held 
corporations.  By not accounting for them, the standard analytical 
framework for close corporations potentially obscures the risks of private 
company investment. 
In addition, by emphasizing the relationship between investor-manager 
agency costs and inter-investor agency costs in VC finance, this Article 
highlights the dynamic character of agency problems in a firm.  Recall again 
that it was Benchmarks attempt to control investor-manager agency risk 
with Junipers management through staged financing and syndication that 
created the potential for inter-investor agency risk with CIBC.  Closely 
related to the development of this inter-investor agency risk was the fact 
that these investors were VC funds subject to the capital/time investment 
constraint and significant investment return incentives.  Also related to the 
size of this agency risk was the existence of the preferred stock contract 
provisions that were negotiated between Benchmark and CIBCmost 
importantly, the veto rights retained by Benchmark.  An accurate ex ante 
                                                
256 See supra TAN 4-5; see also Paul G. Mahoney, Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations, in 
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675 (1990); Douglas K. Moll, 
Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 749 (2000); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet To Set: Match-
Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913 (1999). 
257 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 279 (recognizing that although contractual 
mechanisms have evolved to protect minority shareholders, [t]he more power minority shareholders 
have, the more likely is deadlock...). 
258 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 243. 
259 See supra TAN 5; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 228-252 (Because closely 
held corporations do not separate management from risk bearing, monitoring is less costly). 
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assessment of Benchmarks potential agency risks in investing in Juniper 
would have required consideration of the interplay of all of these factors. 
The dynamic character of agency costs has importantand 
understudiedimplications for corporate scholarship.  Traditionally, 
agency cost theory has been utilized to determine how agency problems 
might increase a firms cost of capital.  All other things being equal, 
investors will demand a higher rate of return as compensation for higher 
agency costs.260  The dynamic character of agency problems provides a 
further twist to the preceding analysis:  not only must an investor account 
for the multiple dimensions of agency problems in a firm; she must also 
account for any agency problems that will arise when she seeks to address 
them (e.g., through bonding or monitoring efforts).  Thus, in pricing a start-
up company investment, a rationale VC investor must consider not only 
agency risks with management, but the agency risks that might develop with 
other VC investors once she tries to reduce these investor-manager agency 
risks.  The extent of these inter-investor agency risks, in turn, may be 
affected by characteristics of the investors themselves (e.g., are the VC 
funds nearing the expiration of their investment terms?) and mechanisms 
the VC investor might utilize to reduce these risks (e.g., reciprocal veto 
rights).  After Benchmark, the enforceability of these mechanisms must also 
be considered. 
Nor are the dynamic characteristics of agency costs limited to VC 
investment.  Attempts to reign in investor-manager agency problems born 
by public company shareholders might likewise create additional 
dimensions of agency conflict for shareholders.  Take, for instance, the 
argument for increasing institutional investor activism in corporate 
governance.  In theory, institutional investors should help minimize 
investor-manager agency problems in public corporations by taking an 
active role in corporate governance.261     Institutions typically hold larger 
blocks of shares than individuals and have the resources and incentives to 
develop expertise in making and monitoring public company investments.  
Moreover, their considerable share holdings should enable them to obtain 
directors attention and to make changes in a boards composition when 
firm performance lags.  Indeed, the desire to reunite ownership and 
control by deferring to institutional investors has led to several initiatives 
to empower institutional investors to fulfill this role, such as the SECs 
recent proposal to permit shareholders to nominate directors directly and 
have their nominees listed in the companys proxy statement.262 
                                                
260 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 313 (Prospective minority shareholders will realize 
that the owner-managers interests will diverge somewhat from theirs, hence the price which they will 
pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of the divergence between the managers 
interests and theirs.). 
261 For an articulation of this argument, see generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK 
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Bernard S. Black, 
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990). 
262 See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626 (October 14, 2003). 
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 By granting institutional investors more power, the agency costs of 
investing in public equities are altered but not necessarily reduced.  As 
Stephen Bainbridge has noted, institutional investor activism in practice has 
fallen far short of its theoretical potential.263   The high costs of activism 
have encouraged institutional investors to remain rationally apathetic 
when it comes to exercising shareholder rights or engaging in active firm 
monitoring.264  The exceptions are those shareholders who seek to use 
increased shareholder rights to self-deal or to take private benefits from the 
corporation that are not shared by other investors.  Unions and pensions 
plans, for instance, have been particularly active shareholders, even though 
their activism often redounds to their private benefit.265  A corporate 
investor, too, might seek to use its leverage as a large-block shareholder to 
skew a firms business decision to obtain a larger share of the firms 
businessregardless of whether it enhances firm value.266 Lastly, hedge 
fundsinvestment funds that, like VC funds, have capital/time investment 
constraints and significant investment return incentivesmight utilize 
enhanced shareholder rights to engage in rent-seeking behavior.  For 
instance, a hedge fund might seek to use its shareholder leverage to engage 
in 1980s-style greenmail tactics to extract side payments from company 
management.267  Alternatively, as recently demonstrated in High River 
Limited Partnership v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.,268 a fund might utilize 
derivative transactions to acquire voting rights in a firm without any 
concomitant economic interest.  It can then exercise these voting rights in a 
manner that advances the funds long position in another firm.269  
                                                
263 See Bainbridge, supra not 254, at 10-11. 
264 Id. at 12-14.  
265 See id. at 15-16 (describing instances where union pension funds have used shareholder proposals to 
obtain employee benefits they could not obtain through bargaining).  
266 This technique was vividly illustrated by du Pont Companys investment in General Motors (GM) in 
the early twentieth century.  In 1917, Du Pont substantially increased its equity position in GM as a 
means to secure for du Pont the bulk of GMs artificial leather, polyimide, paint and varnish businesses. 
See Anabtawi, supra note 254, at 18. 
267 See id. at 41 (noting that shareholders can use private negotiations with management to obtain 
greenmail-type payments in exchange for agreeing to support managerial interests); see also 
Hamermesh, supra note 254, at 456 (noting activist stockholders may pursue agendas not shared with 
stockholders as whole and seek to extract[] side payments, akin to greenmail, from management 
interested in eliminating the threat of a stockholder by-law initiative. ). In objecting to the SECs direct 
nomination proposal, the Business Roundtable expressed special concern regarding the potential for 
hedge funds to abuse shareholder nominations as a means to extract greenmail.  See Letter from John 
Castellani, Business Roundable, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commisssion  
(December 22, 2003) (Comments of Martin Lipton) (What Im really worried about are the hedge funds 
and the vulture funds and the other people who will see this as a great opportunity to force companies 
into transactions that may be good for the hedge fund or good for the vulture fund but may not be good 
for other security holders.). 
268 High River Limited Partnership v. Mylan Laborarties, Inc. No. 1:04-cv-02677-SHR (M.D. Pa. 2005, 
case filed Dec. 13, 2004) (case voluntarily dismissed). 
269 Mylan concerned a proposed acquisition of King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (King) by Mylan Laboratories, 
Inc. (Mylan)a transaction that the market regarded as placing too high a value on King.  See Anabtawi, 
supra note 254, at 35.  Perry Corp. (Perry), a hedge fund, acquired a fully hedged position in Mylan such 
that it controlled a large portion of Mylans voting power but had no economic stake in its Mylan shares.  
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Shareholders might seek to combat these types of inter-shareholder agency 
problems, but as demonstrated in the VC context, such efforts will entail 
agency costs of their own.270 
Ultimately, analysis of the full scope of agency problems in VC 
investment returns us to the generality of the agency problem emphasized 
by Jensen and Meckling almost thirty years ago.271  The agency problems 
confronting investors are multiple and, as shown in the context of VC 
investment, often inter-related.  By focusing exclusively on one dimension 
of agency riskbe it the agency risks with management in a public 
corporation or the agency risk among shareholders in a private company
we risk obscuring the full dimension of agency problems facing corporate 
investment. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
This Article has used VC finance to introduce into corporate scholarship 
an appreciation for the dynamic formation of agency problems among 
and withina firms various stakeholder groups.  VC scholarshiplike 
corporate scholarship in generalhas long overlooked how investors can 
face multiple dimensions of agency risk.  As this Article has shown, the 
techniques that VC investors use to minimize investor-manager conflicts 
often create the potential for conflict among investors themselves.  For 
many companies such as FormFactor, success in developing a companys 
technology and business, combined with healthy market conditions, permit 
these conflicts to remain primarily potential conflicts, hidden from 
exposure.  Even in these situations, however, the possibility of inter-investor 
conflict fundamentally affects investment risk and defines the structure of 
VC contracts in critical ways.  And where an investment fails to conform to 
these idealized conditions, Benchmark shows us how easily these potential 
conflicts can turn into actual ones.   
More generally, analysis of the dynamic relationship between investor-
manager and inter-investor agency risk in VC finance has broader 
implications for corporate scholarship.  This result can hardly be surprising.  
The traditional model of the start-up company is a common starting point 
for numerous paradigms of the firm and their associated theories of 
corporate law.272  By revealing the flaws of the traditional model of VC 
                                                                                                             
Because Perry held a long-position in King, it used its Mylan voting power to advance the King 
acquisition. High River Limited Partnership (High River), a hedge fund controlled by Carl Icahn, held a 
large long-position in Mylan and a short-position in King in the expectation that the over-valued 
transaction would collapse.  High River initiated the suit to enjoin Perry from voting its Mylan shares to 
approve the merger.  See id. at 35-36. 
270 Cf. id. at 18-19 (describing shareholder efforts to oppose rent-seeking as potentially creating 
squabbling costs that are born by shareholders but consume resources that have a positive opportunity 
cost somewhere else in the economy simply in attempting to shuffle wealth among shareholders). 
271 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 309. 
272 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 275-76 (using hypothetical start-up company to demonstrate 
team production model); G. Mitu Gulati, et. al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 896 
 MANAGING RISK ON A $25 MILLION BET 62 
investment, one might naturally expect paradigms of the firm that have been 
constructed with it to appear all the more fragile.  This conclusion seems 
particularly appropriate for the grand design principal agent paradigm 
that, like the traditional model of VC investment, concerns itself primarily 
with the agency problems that exist between shareholders and managers.  
The experience of the VC industry suggests that to appreciate fully the 
scope of agency problems within a firm, one must contend with the multiple 
dimensions in which these problems can exist and the dynamic manner in 
which they interact.  Analysis of the VC market suggests that rational 
investors are well aware of these problems and the investment risks they 
create.  Corporate scholarship should be as well. 
                                                                                                             
(2000) (using venture-backed start-up company to set forth a connected contracts model of 
collaborative economic activity).  
